Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety Obligations by Madden, M. Stuart
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1-1-2001
Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety
Obligations
M. Stuart Madden
Pace Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Madden, M. Stuart, "Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety Obligations" (2001). Pace Law Faculty Publications. Paper 141.
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/141
Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State 
Safety Obligations 
M. Stuart Madden* 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction.. .. . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 104 
11. Types of Preemption.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 
A. Express Preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 
B. Implied Preemption.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 
i. General Implied Preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 
. . 
11. Field Preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 
iii. Conflict Preemption.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 
111. Preemption and Regulatory Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 
A. Tobacco Product Labeling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 
i. Warnings or Misrepresentation Claims 
Regarding Second-Hand Smoke or Nicotine 
Addiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 
B. Pesticide, Herbicide and Rodenticide Labeling. 120 
i. Decisional Law Prior to Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1 
ii. Decisional Law After Cippollone v. Liggett 
Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 
C. Motor Vehicle Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 
i. Decisional Law Prior to Geier v. American 
Honda Motor Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 
ii. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. . . . . . . . 136 
D. Food, Drugs and Cosmetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 
E. Medical Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 
- - 
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. Professor 
Madden's most recent publications include the co-authored DAVID G. OWEN, M. 
STUART MADDEN & MARY J. DAVIS, MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY (3d 
ed.) (2 vols., vol. 3 Appendices)(2000); GERALD W. BOSTON, M. STUART MADDEN, 
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 
(2d ed.) (2000); AND JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE AND M. STUART MAD- 
DEN, UNDERSTANDING TORTS (2d ed.) (2000). 
Heinonline - -  21 Pace L. Rev. 103 2000-2001 
104 PACE LAW REVIEW Pol. 21:103 
i. Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976 
generally.. ................................. 144 
ii. Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976 
Preemption Provision ...................... 145 
iii. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr and the Decisional 
Law Thereafter ............................ 146 
F. Miscellaneous Product and Subject 
Classifications ................................. 152 
i. Federal Boat Safety Act ................... 152 
ii. Consumer Product Safety Act.. ............ 154 
iii. Federal Hazardous Substance Act ......... 155 
IV. Conclusion.. ....................................... 157 
Abstract 
The reach of Federal statutory preemption of inconsistent state law 
obligations has extended to numerous products liability subject 
matters, including most notably tobacco products, agricultural 
pesticides, medical devices and automobile air bags. The Supreme 
Court decision in  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Znc. countenanced a 
broad application of federal preemption when the subject statute 
contained a n  express preemption clause. Eight years later the 
Court appeared to back away from Cipollone, and held in  Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Co. that even as  to statutes with express 
preemption clauses, the simultaneous presence of a savings clause 
might trigger a narrow reading of the preemption provision. The 
potential effect of Geier upon lower court decisions i n  liability suits 
involving pesticides, medical devices, or even tobacco products, 
will necessarily be played out i n  litigation before lower courts for 
years to come. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The significance of federal statutory preemption of incon- 
sistent state tort law obligations was branded on the hind- 
quarters of products liability law in the 1992 Supreme Court 
decision of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. l Cipollone's empha- 
sis on textual express preemption was followed by numerous 
lower court decisions holding that  federal health and safety 
rules in product subject categories ranging from pesticides to 
1. 501 U.S. 504 (1992). 
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prostheses to propellers should be given sway over inconsistent 
state common law liability or statutory obligations. 
The Cipollone-sparked romp over the historical federal hes- 
itance to impose federal regulation in areas of health, safety 
and welfare traditionally ceded to the individual states was 
brought to a pause, if not a halt, by the Supreme Court's 2000 
decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.2 In Geier, an air 
bag case, the Court gave new vitality to the application of ordi- 
nary preemption principles even in the context of a federal 
safety statute that contained an express preemption provision 
clause, should such statute also contain a "savings" clause pro- 
vision essaying to preserve common law damage claims from 
any preemptive consequences. The implications of Geier and its 
explicit distancing from Cipollone will surely roil the waters of 
products liability litigation for years to come. 
11. TYPES OF PREEMPTION 
A. Express preemption 
Perhaps the most important emerging issue in modern 
products liability law is the role of the federal statutory preemp- 
tion of private civil suits brought under state statutory or com- 
mon law. Characteristically, the question of the appropri- 
ateness of federal preemption is implicated when such state law 
claims for damages or equitable remedies trench upon the same 
safety objectives, which Congress has addressed directly, or in- 
directly through federal statute or administrative regulation. 
As discussed below, the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Cipol- 
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc.3 gave new definition to the constitu- 
tional doctrine of federal legislative preemption, and provided a 
basis for modern application of the tenets of that doctrine in a 
range of accident law and regulatory settings. 
In general terms, federal safety-related statutes, or regula- 
tions pursuant to those statutes, that pertain to a particular 
field or subject matter may be deemed to preempt state regula- 
tion or common law that would impose design, performance, or 
informational requirements upon a seller that are inconsistent 
with the federal standard. Federal law may also preempt suits 
2. - U.S. -, 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000). 
3. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
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brought under state common law or state codification of com- 
mon law principles that create the risk that a seller who has 
satisfied federal safety-related requirements might neverthe- 
less be found liable in money damages, or subject to equitable 
relief, in a products liability suit.4 The primacy of federal law in 
such subject areas as Congress may elect to regulate is 
grounded in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitu- 
tion, which provides that the laws of the United States "shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and . . . any Thing in the Consti- 
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."S 
Preemption may be either express or implied, and "is com- 
pelled whether Congress's command is explicitly stated in the 
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and 
purpose."6 Issues of express preemption are textual, while 
questions of implied preemption are contextual. By this it is 
meant that the question of whether federal law expressly 
preempts inconsistent or additional state common law, statu- 
tory or regulatory requirements may be deduced from the ex- 
plicit language of a federal ~ t a t u t e . ~  Implied preemption, in 
contrast, must ordinarily be inferred from an evaluation of not 
only the language of the statute, which may or may not contain 
a preemption clause, but also from an assessment of the overall 
statutory objectives. As to the latter, a full understanding of 
statutory objectives will frequently be informed by pertinent 
4. Where applicable, federal preemption precludes coequally state statutes, 
regulations or common law enforcement claims. Cf. Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., 
Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 327-28 (2d Cir. 1985), afd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986)(ERISA), refer- 
enced with approval in Oglesby v. Delaware & Hudson R.R. Co.,180 F.3d 458 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (held: railroad employee personal injury claim against employer and 
manufacturer of engineer cab seat impliedly preempted by Locomotive Boiler and 
Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § $ 20701-20903). 
Also, the application of preemption principles to state statutory/regulatory 
and common law pursuits alike is explained by the Supreme Court's observation in 
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (19591, that 
awards of money damages in suits for civil liability can act as  a "potent method of 
governing conduct and controlling policy." 
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, 8 2. 
6. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); See generally Oja v. 
Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1997) (held: negligent failure to warn 
claim in hip prothesis products liability action is not preempted under 1976 Medi- 
cal Device Act Amendments). Preemption issues associated with medical devices 
are discussed below in $ II(H). 
7. See generally Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504 (1992), discussed in detail a t  II(A) 
below. 
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legislative history and the interpretation of the statute given it 
by the regulatory agency charged with its effectuation.8 
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in its interpre- 
tation of the Supremacy Clause as applicable to state law pre- 
emption "starts with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal 
Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Con- 
gress."g Express preemption is properly found "[wlhen Con- 
gress has considered the issue of preemption and has included 
in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that 
issue, and when that provision provides a 'reliable indicium of 
congressional intent with respect to  state authority[.]"'l0 In the 
words of one court concerning express preemption: 
Federal preemption is a relatively simple concept, especially 
when Congress has explicitly provided the terms of preemption. 
It provides order. Instead of having 50 or more standards with 
respect to a given human pursuit, there is one. When a preemp- 
tive federal standard is applied evenhandedly, it further provides 
both the protection of the federal standard and some leeway to 
develop state standards where the federal standard does not 
apply.ll 
A party advancing the defense of federal preemption must 
overcome an established presumption against federal preemp- 
tion of state law. Thus any statutory provision forming the ba- 
sis of a preemption defense will be narrowly construed,12 
consistent with the tenet that state police powers, particularly 
state regulations relating to health and safety, should not be 
8. Implied preemption of state common law or statutory products liability liti- 
gation is discussed in 3 I(B) below. 
9. Cipollone, 505 U.S. a t  516 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947)). 
10. Id. at 517. 
11. Steele v. Collagen Corp., 54 Cal. App. 4th 1474 (1997) (citations omitted) 
(personal injury claims arising from administration of Zyderm). 
12. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr., 518 U.S. 470, 484 (19961, interpreted in Ryan v. 
Brunswick Corp., 557 N.W.2d 541,546 (Mich. 1997) (federal decision not to require 
boat propeller guards found to preempt state law personal injury claims grounded 
in argument that propeller guards would have prevented or lessened decedent's 
injury). 
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superseded without a demonstration that such preemption is 
the "clear and unequivocal intent of Congress."l3 
B .  Implied preemption 
i. General implied preemption 
Where a federal safety-related statute does not contain lan- 
guage providing expressly for its preemptive effect, and, where 
pertinent, the preemptive effect of regulations or standards 
promulgated pursuant thereto, the products liability defendant 
will attempt to argue that the language of the statute, the con- 
text of the federal regulatory interest, and the wishes of the con- 
gressional authors, read together, require the conclusion that 
inconsistent or additional state law claims or requirements are 
impliedly preempted.14 This subsection and the two to  follow 
describe briefly the three principal theories underlying the doc- 
trine of implied preemption.15 
Defendant's defense of general implied preemption may 
succeed upon a showing that the scope of the safety-related 
statute, including a fact-specific appreciation of its comprehen- 
13. Ryan, 557 N.W.2d at 546 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). See 
Hillsborough Co. v. Automated Medical Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985). 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Medtronic, matters of the citizenry's health 
and safety "are primarily and historically matters of local concern[,]" and therefore 
"the States traditionally have a great latitude under their police powers to legis- 
late as to the protection of the lives, limbs, comfort and quiet of all persons." Med- 
tronic, 518 U.S. at 475. 
14. See, e.g., Carter H .  Dukes, Comment, Alcohol Manufacturers and the Duty 
to Warn: An Analysis of Recent Case Law in Light of the Alcoholic Beverage Label- 
ing Act of 1988, 38 EMORY L.J. 1189 (1989) (27 U.S.C.A. QQ 201-210 (West 1988) 
expressly preempts claims against alcohol manufacturers for failure to warn, but 
neither expressly nor impliedly precludes plaintiffs' cause of action for promotional 
and advertising activities). 
15. The three analytically distinct types of implied preemption that courts 
have recognized are (1) general implied preemption, (2) field preemption, and (3) 
conflict preemption. Ordered differently, the factor analysis employed by many 
courts in adopting these distinctions were summarized by the Supreme Court in 
this way: (1) "Congress' intent to supersede state law altogether may be found 
from a 'scheme of federal regulation so persuasive as to make reasonable the infer- 
ence that Congress left no room to supplement it;"' (2) an act of Congress may 
touch a field in which the federal interest is "so dominant that the federal system 
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject;" or (3) 
because "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of 
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose." Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Assoc. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
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siveness and its particularity, taken together with the observa- 
tions of its congressional authors and its regulatory legal 
experts, demonstrates that toleration of inconsistent or addi- 
tional state common law or statutory requirements would frus- 
trate the purpose of the federal act.16 As the Supreme Court 
has explained, in the absence of language revealing "an explicit 
congressional intent to preempt state law," courts examining 
the potential that federal law impliedly preempts state statu- 
tory or common law claims should consider "whether the federal 
statute's 'structure and purpose,' or nonspecific statutory lan- 
guage, reveal a clear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent."l7 
ii. Field preemption 
Even though concepts of federalism preserve a constitu- 
tional reluctance to permit federal law to supplant state regula- 
tory prerogative, particularly in matters associated with the 
health, safety and welfare of citizens of that state, there are two 
additional theories by which a federal safety-related statute 
may be deemed to impliedly preempt an additional or inconsis- 
tent state claim or requirement. A second means of implied pre- 
emption is termed "field preemption." A conclusion that state 
statutory or common law remedies are preempted by a federal 
statutory initiative may be warranted when examination of the 
federal statute and allied regulations permit the conclusion that 
in passing the statute and creating the regulatory authority of 
the pertinent federal agency or agencies, Congress intended 
that federal law and regulation effectively and functionally oc- 
cupy the safety field that the state law or regulation would pur- 
port to enter. Field preemption may be found when Congress or 
its administrative delegees have "so thoroughly occupied a leg- 
islative field 'as to  make reasonable the inference that Congress 
left no room for the states to supplement it."'18 
A finding of field preemption of state statutory enforcement 
or common law liability claims does not turn upon whether the 
federal agency has actually initiated regulation in the pertinent 
16. See Phillip Morris, Inc., v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 66-67 (1st Cir. 1997). 
17. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1996). 
18. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. Compare with Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Ox- 
endine, 649 A.2d 825 (D. C. Cir. 1994) (held: FDA regulations did not implicitly 
preempt state common law claims in Bendectin-related litigation). 
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subject matter, but rather upon whether it is empowered to do 
~0.19 The Supreme Court so confirmed in Napier u. Atlantic 
Coast Line R. Co.20 in which, interpreting the Locomotive Boiler 
Inspection Act,21 it wrote: "The fact that the [Interstate Com- 
merce] Commission has not seen fit to exercise its authority to 
the full extent conferred, has no bearing on the construction of 
the act delegating the power."22 
iii. Conflict preemption 
Third, additional or inconsistent state safety common law 
or statutory obligations or requirements may be deemed to be 
impliedly preempted where the obligations or prohibitions im- 
posed by state statute or regulation "actually conflic[t] with fed- 
eral lawYn23 which is to say, in instances in which "compliance 
with both state and federal law is a 'physical impossibility,' or 
where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of C~ngress . ' "~~  
This type of implied preemption is described as "conflict" 
preemption. 
As is true in matters of potential express preemption, 
courts have adopted a rebuttable presumption against all types 
of implied preemption that would supplant state legislative au- 
thority, particularly where such preemption is urged in actions 
implicating accident law. In one court's words: "Where the 
state laws a t  issue affect health and safety issues, there is a 
presumption against implied preemption by congressional 
 enactment^."^^ 
19. See Oglesby, 180 F.3d 458,461 (2nd Cir. 1999) ("[Tlhe relevant question is 
not whether the federal government has exercised its authority but whether it pos- 
sesses the power in the f i s t  place."). 
20. 272 U.S. 605 (1926). 
21. See 49 U.S.C. $5 20701-20903. 
22. Napier, 272 U.S. at 613. 
23. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. 
24. Philip Morris, Znc., 122 F.3d 58,68 (1st Cir. 1997). Accord Oxendine, 649 
A.2d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating "Third, preemption results if state law di- 
rectly conflicts with a federal law in one of two ways: compliance with both federal 
and state law is impossible, or state law obstructs the federal purpose.") 
25. Oxendine, 649 A.2d at 828 (citing Hillsborough County v.Automated Medi- 
cal Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)). Accord Mazur v. Merck & co., 742 F. 
Supp. 239,245 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (suit against manufacturer of measles, mumps and 
rubella vaccine brought by parents of a child who contracted subacute sclerosing 
panencephalitis (SSPE)). 
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111. PREEMPTION AND REGULATORY ISSUES 
A. Tobacco Product Labeling 
Preemption analysis as it relates to tobacco product mat- 
ters derives almost exclusively from the Supreme Court deci- 
sion in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, I n ~ . ~ 6  In Cipollone, the Court 
reiterated that "Congress' intent may be 'explicitly stated in the 
statute's language or implicitly contained in the structure and 
purpose.'"27 Consistent with the discussion of implied preemp- 
tion, the Court confirmed that even absent express or explicit 
preemption, state law may be preempted where "that law actu- 
ally conflicts with federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly 
occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the inference 
that Congress left no room for the States to  supplement it."'28 
The suit in Cipollone was filed in the New Jersey federal 
trial court by Rose Cipollone, who would die of lung disease one 
year later, and her husband. The plaintiffs alleged that ciga- 
rette manufacturers: (1) sold a product that was defectively de- 
signed, in that there were safer alternative designs for 
cigarettes, and because the social utility of cigarettes was vastly 
outweighed by the dangers inhering in their use; (2) failed to 
provide adequate warnings; (3) "were negligent in the manner 
[that] they tested, researched, sold, promoted and advertised" 
cigarettes; (4) breached express warranties as to the lack 
of health risks from smoking; (5) fraudulently misrepresented 
health risks, thereby neutralizing federally mandated warn- 
ings; (6) "ignored and failed to act upon" scientific and medical 
data showing the health risks of cigarette smoking; and (7) by 
"conspiracy to defraud" combined with other manufacturers to 
deny the public of medical and scientific i n f~ rma t ion .~~  
Section 5 of the 1965 Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act ("1965 Act"), captioned "Preemption," provided "(a) No 
statement relating to smoking and health, other than the [Sec- 
tion 41 statement . . . shall be required on any cigarette pack- 
age," and "(b) no [such] statement . . . shall be required in the 
26. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
27. Id. at 516. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. a t  509-10. The Cipollone decision itself did not address the issue of 
product defectiveness. See Richardson v. Phillip Moms, Inc., 950 F.Supp 700 (D. 
Md. 1997). 
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advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled 
in conformity with" Section 4.30 Section 5 (b) was amended by 
the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 ("1969 Act") to 
specify that: "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking 
and health shall be imposed under state law with respect to the 
advertising and promotion of any cigarette the packages of 
which are [lawfully] labeled."31 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that Congress "had 
impliedly pre-empted . . . claims challenging the adequacy of 
warnings on labels or in advertising or the propriety of [the 
manufacturers'] advertising and promotional a~tivities."3~ The 
Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part.33 The 
Court found that the preemptive scope of the 1965 Act and the 
1969 Act was governed entirely by the express language of $ 5  
of each A ~ t , 3 ~  and that, therefore, no justification existed for 
evaluating the possibility of implied preemption.35 
At the same time, the Cipollone Court determined that the 
appellate court erred in concluding that the preemptive lan- 
guage of the two respective Acts was operatively indistinguish- 
able. In the Court's view, $ 5 of the 1965 Act "only preempted 
state and federal rule-making bodies from mandating particu- 
lar cautionary statements and did not preempt state common 
law damages actions."36 The Court reasoned that (1) the pre- 
sumption against the preemption of state police power regula- 
tions required a narrow reading of the 1965 preemption 
provision;37 (2) label warning mandated by the 1965 Act's § 4 
30. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C.A. $5 1331-1340 
(West 1965). 
31. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C.A. $0 1331-1340 
(West 1969). 
32. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (citing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rul- 
ing in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986)). In so 
doing, the Court observed that the Third Circuit had placed unwarranted reliance 
upon the fact that the 1969 Act did not alter the statement of purpose from the 
1965 Labeling Act. Id. a t  517 n. 13. 
33. Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); see Richard C. Ausness, The Impact of the 
Cipollone Case on Federal Preemption Law, 15 J.PRoD. & Tox.LM. 1 (1993). 
34. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517. 
35. See id. 
36. Id. at 519-20. Elsewhere in its opinion the court uses the terminology 
"positive enactmentn synonymously with a "mandat[el [as to] particular cautionary 
statements[.]" Id. a t  520. 
37. See id. at 518-19. 
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"does not by its own effect foreclose additional obligations im- 
posed under state law,"38 because the mere fact "that Congress 
requires a particular warning does not pre-empt a regulatory 
field;"39 and (3) "there is no general, inherent conflict between 
federal preemption of state warning requirements and the con- 
tinued viability of state common law damages action~."~O All of 
these considerations led the Court to conclude that 8 5 of the 
1965 Act "superseded only positive enactments by legislatures 
or administrative agencies that mandate particular warning 
labels."41 
Disagreeing with the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court 
found that the preemptive language in the 1969 Act was materi- 
ally different-and substantially broader in application-than 
the preemptive language in the 1965 Act. The Court explained: 
First, the 119691 Act bars not simply 'satement[sl' but rather 're- 
quirement[~] or prohibition[s] . . . imposed under State law.' Sec- 
ond, the later Act reaches beyond statements 'in the advertising' 
to 'obligations with respect to the advertising or promotion' of 
 cigarette^.^^ 
The Supreme Court continued by noting that this broader read- 
ing was justified, in part, on the basis that the 1969 Act sub- 
stantially altered the 1965 Act by "rewriting the label warning, 
banning broadcast advertising, and allowing the FTC to regu- 
late print advertising."43 
In addition, the Court found that the phrase "imposed 
under state law7' is not limited to "positive enactments" obligati- 
ing manufacturers to employ particular cautionary language or 
symbols.44 Focusing on the 1969 Act's broader language of "re- 
quirements or prohibitions,"45 the Supreme Court considered 
whether or not personal injury claims brought under state law 
might operate as a de facto imposition of a requirement or a 
prohibition. The question the Court posed could be put this 
way: "Does imposition of or vulnerability to  a plaintiffs verdict 
38. Id. at 518. 
39. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 518-19. 
42. Id. at 520. 
43. Id. 
44. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522. 
45. Id. at 521-24. 
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arising from a claim that the manufacturer should have pro- 
vided warnings in addition to those required by the 1969 Act 
impose an obligation upon the manufacturer that can be consid- 
ered a requirement or a prohibition within the meaning of the 
1969 Act?" The Supreme Court answered its own question 
affirmati~ely.~~ 
The Court stated that "the central inquiry" in the matter 
before it was straightforward: "We ask whether the legal duty 
that is the predicate of the common-law damages action consti- 
tutes a 'requirement or prohibition based on smoking and 
health . . . imposed under State law with respect to . . . advertis- 
ing or promotion,' giving that clause a fair but narrow read- 
ing."47 Applying this "straightforward" analysis to the common 
law claims advanced by Mrs. Cipollone and her husband, the 
Supreme Court held that a products liability action alleging 
failure to provide adequate warnings was in essence a claim 
that the manufacturer's "post-1969 advertising or promotions 
should have included additional, or more clearly stated, warn- 
ings[.In4* Such a failure to warn claim was, by the terms of the 
1969 Act, preempted.49 
A different result was appropriate, however, for such tort 
claims as were not associated with the advertising or promotion 
of cigarettes. Thus, the Supreme Court made clear that the 
1969 Act did not operate to preempt claims in tort that might be 
based upon "the testing or research practices [of a defendant,] 
or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion [of ciga- 
rettes.l"50 Further, the Supreme Court continued, the plaintiffs' 
claims for breach of an express warranty were not precluded 
insofar as they derived from the contractual nature of the rela- 
tionship between the seller and buyer, rather than being im- 
posed by state law.51 Thus, the Cipollone Court concluded "a 
common law remedy for a contractual commitment voluntarily 
46. See id. a t  524. 
47. Id. a t  523-24. 
48. Id. a t  524. 
49. Cipollone, 505 U.S. a t  524. 
50. Id. a t  524-25. 
51. See id. a t  525-26. The Court's evaluation regarding express warranties is 
of limited modern significance, as  today, unlike the era in which Mrs. Cipollone 
began to smoke, no tobacco manufacturer is so incautious as to plump the health 
virtues of smoking. 
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undertaken should not be regarded as a 'requirement . . . im- 
posed under State law' within the meaning of 8 5(b)."52 
The plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer had engaged 
in two distinct types of misrepresentation. Taking each misrep- 
resentation claim in turn, the Court found that a claim for 
fraudulent misrepresentation premised upon an allegation that 
the advertising practices of the cigarette manufacturers neu- 
tralized the effect of federally-mandated warning labels was 
preempted by the 1969 Act.53 Noting the interrelationship be- 
tween regulatory prohibitions on advertising that downplay 
dangers of smoking and the associated statutory requirements 
for warnings, the Court found that such a theory of fraudulent 
misrepresentation was inextricably related to a theory of failure 
to  warn and was similarly preempted.54 
The Supreme Court recognized, however, an important dis- 
tinction between fraudulent misrepresentation claims associ- 
ated with advertising and other forms or venues of 
misrepresentation. An example of the former might be a bill- 
board with an image of young vibrant persons engaged in vigor- 
ous physical activity, serving to convey the message that 
cigarette smoking is compatible with cardiovascular fitness. 
Examples of the latter type of misrepresentation such as evi- 
dence that the cigarette manufacturers concealed material facts 
from administrative agencies, or that they included false state- 
ments of material fact, e.g., carbon monoxide or tar levels, in 
their advertising, would not be preempted by the 1969 Act.s5 
The Court reasoned that this second type of fraudulent misrep- 
resentation claim was predicated on state law duties to disclose 
material facts, rather than on advertising and promotion. To 
further clarify the distinction, the Supreme Court stated that in 
the former type of alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, such 
as billboards, print media and the like, state laws obligating 
manufacturers to  disclose safety or health risks to administra- 
tive agencies were "obligations with respect to advertising or 
promotion" and a state law claim premised upon the breach of 
52. Id. at 526. 
53. See id. at 527. 
54. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 528. 
55. See id. 
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that duty would be preempted.S6 Claims that an advertisement 
contains a false statement of a material fact, in contrast, are not 
"predicated upon a duty based on smoking and health, but 
rather on a more general obligation-the duty not to deceive."57 
Regarding plaintiffs conspiracy claims, the Court found these, 
too, were not preempted, as the duty not to  conspire to  commit 
fraud is not a prohibition "based on smoking and health."58 
In summarizing its holding, the Court wrote: 
The 1965 Act did not pre-empt state law damages actions; the 
1969 Act pre-empts petitioner's claims based on a failure to warn 
and the neutralization of federally mandated warnings to the ex- 
tent that those claims rely on omissions or inclusions in respon- 
dents' advertising or promotions; the 1969 Act does not pre-empt 
petitioner's claims based on express warranty, intentional fraud 
and misrepresentation, or c o n ~ p i r a c y . ~ ~  
Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and 
Souter, concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that 
the modified language of $ 5(b) in the 1969 Act did not clearly 
exhibit the necessary congressional intent to preempt state 
common law damage actions.60 The three Justices concluded, 
therefore, that the plaintiffs' various failure to  warn and fraud- 
ulent misrepresentation claims, as well as express warranty 
and conspiracy claims, should not be preempted by the 1969 
Conversely, Justices Scalia and Thomas argued that all 
of petitioner's common law claims were preempted by the 1969 
Act.62 
i. Warnings or misrepresentation claims regarding 
second-hand smoke or nicotine addiction 
The legislative history is ambiguous as to  whether Con- 
gress, in either the 1965 or  the 1969 Acts, contemplated that 
the labeling provisions should cover risks that were then un- 
known, or as to which the scientific and medical data were in- 
56. Id. at 528. 
57. Id. at 528-29. 
58. See id. 
59. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31. 
60. See id. at 531-44. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. at 544-56. 
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cipient, or as it is sometimes put, "immature." Cipollone did not 
address the issue of whether the 1969 Act should be interpreted 
to  preempt warning or misrepresentation claims regarding 
risks allegedly associated with second-hand smoke or nicotine 
addiction. Read together, the statements of purpose and the 
committee reports underlying the 1965 and the 1969 Acts per- 
mit no confident conclusion. Evaluation of whether the 1969 
Act ought properly to  preempt claims that the manufacturers 
fraudulently concealed or purposefully misrepresented informa- 
tion regarding claimed risks of injurious exposure to second- 
hand smoke or nicotine addiction requires examination of the 
legislative tradeoffs, or bargained-for exchanges, if any, that 
were involved in the consideration of and drafting of the 1969 
Act. In this connection, the legislative history of the 1965 Act 
also enjoys a role, as the metes and bounds of congressional con- 
sideration in both the 1965 and the 1969 Acts may, to a cautious 
extent, be considered collectively. 
Section 2 of the 1965 Act declared that the statute's two 
purposes were "(1) adequately informing the public that ciga- 
rette smoking may be hazardous to  health, and (2) protecting 
the national economy from the burden imposed by diverse, 
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising 
regulations."63 Both the statement of the 1965 Act's purpose, 
and the language comprising its required labeling, make it clear 
that Congress intended the warnings to convey to  the public 
only that cigarette "smoking" could be hazardous to health. 
Section 2 further states that the goal of the mandated warning 
language is that of "informing the public that cigarette smoking 
can be hazardous to health," while Section 4 of the 1965 Act 
required a specific label stating, among other things: "Caution: 
Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous To Your Health."G4 No- 
where referenced in the statute's statement of purpose or its re- 
quired labeling is the suggestion that a message was intended 
to be conveyed to nonsmokers, i.e., information suggesting that 
smoking by others could be hazardous to  nonsmokers. It ap- 
pears, therefore, that in the absence of any arguable revelation 
of congressional intent that this too was an objective of the 1965 
or 1969 Acts, neither Act can logically be construed to  apply to 
63. Id. at 514. 
64. Cipollone, 505 U.S at 514. 
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the health claims arising from the health risks of exposure to 
secondhand smoke. 
The legislative history for the 1969 Act contains several ref- 
erences to the Congressional authors' awareness of (1) the risks 
of inhalation of environmental smoke and (2) the potential that 
with the passage of time, additional health risks of tobacco 
would be discovered and proved. Senate Report 91-56665 and 
the accompanying Conference Report to Public Law 91-222,66 
otherwise known as the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 
1969,67 contains several references to cigarette-related health 
risks. The fair inference of this is that, in passing the 1969 Act, 
(1) Congress was aware of health dangers other than the ortho- 
dox litany, i.e., respiratory disease, lung disease, pulmonary 
disease; and (2) Congress was further aware of health risks 
posed to individuals other than the smokers themselves. 
As to the issue of nicotine dependence, the Conference Re- 
port to the 1969 Act cited conspicuously a 1967 FTC Report, 
filed pursuant to the 1965 Act 3 5(d)(2), which stated that the 
very fact that "cigarette smoking is so strongly habit forming" 
was a basis for its statement that "it is unlikely that a mildly 
phrased cautionary statement will have any effect on confirmed 
cigarette smokers."68 The Senate Report later reiterated the 
FTC's observations that "another aspect of cigarette smoking 
that is . . . ignored, and has vital implications in terms of health 
hazard, is the fact that cigarette smoking is strongly habit form- 
As a result of the reports, the FTC recommended the 
listing of nicotine content on cigarette packages. 
Further reflective of Congress's awareness that not only tar 
levels, but also nicotine levels, contributed to the health risks, 
S. Rep. No. 91-566 referenced the Department of Health, Edu- 
cation and Welfare's (HEW) recommendation, filed pursuant to 
the 1965 Act, that "levels of 'tar' and nicotine in cigarette smoke 
should be published on cigarette packages[.In70 That the 1969 
Act contemplated the potential of new discernible health risks 
65. S. REP. NO. 91-566, (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2653 
66. H.R. REP. NO. 91-897 (19701, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2676. 
67. See id. See also 15 U.S.C.A. $0 1331-1340 (West 1997). 
68. S.  REP. NO. 91-566 (19691, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2655. 
69. Id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2656. 
70. Id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2655. 
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of tobacco use was reflected in 5 8 of the Act, "continu[ingl the 
requirement that the Secretary of [HEW . . . transmit reports 
to Congress . . . providing current information on the health 
consequences of smoking[.]"71 In addition, the Senate Bill con- 
firmed that the preemption entailed "is narrowly phrased to 
preempt only state action based on smoking and health. . . . It 
would in no way," the Report points out, "affect the power of any 
state . . . [regarding] the prohibition of smoking in public 
buildings [.I "72 
Commentators have urged that in the specific context of 
second-hand smoke claims, the labeling and advertising re- 
quirements do not extend to nonsmokers subjected to second- 
hand smoke; "reliance on the notice given to smokers via the 
labeling act[sl . . . cannot apply to nonsmokers, as they are not 
the ones who are warned through the contents of the cigarette 
labe1."73 To further the argument that the warning provisions 
apply to smokers and not to nonsmokers is the fact that the lan- 
guage of the 1965 Act references the relationship between ciga- 
rette "smoking" and health, rather than a reference to the 
effects of "smoke" and health, a usage equally available to the 
legislative authors of the Act. 
As to the question of whether at  the very time of passing 
the 1969 Act Congress visualized that additional tobacco use 
health risks might be discovered, as previously noted, the perti- 
nent Conference Report noted the inclusion of a new 5 8 to the 
Act that directed HEW to report to Congress "current informa- 
tion on the health consequences of smoking . . ."74 One potential 
interpretation of this provision is that the congressional au- 
thors imagined that yet undiscovered health risks tied to to- 
bacco use might be unearthed in the future and that Congress 
should not be considered to have preempted that which has not 
visualized. However, preemption advocates might respond that 
warnings or misrepresentation state law claims associated with 
such new risks would bear the unmistakable earmarks of "re- 
quirements or prohibitions relating to advertising or promotion 
71. Id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2662. 
72. Id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663. 
73. Cindy L. Pressman, No Smoking Please: A Proposal for Recognition of 
Non-Smokers'Rights Through Torts Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 595 (1993). 
74. Id. at 33, 34. 
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of cigarettes" as those terms of art have been constructed by the 
Cipollone Court.75 
Various state disclosure laws have been held not to tram- 
mel preemption provisions under comparable tobacco-related 
acts.76 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the district court's ruling that a state Disclosure Act 
was not preempted by either the 1969 Act or the Smokeless To- 
bacco At issue was the Massachusetts Disclosure Act,78 
that required "manufacturers of tobacco products to disclose the 
additives and nicotine yield ratings of their products to the 
state's public health department."79 The court in Philip Morris, 
Inc. v. Harshbargeflo held that the Disclosure Act did not 'relate 
to' advertising or promotion because it lack[edl the requisite 
'reference to' or 'connection with' the preempted realm."sl The 
appellate court also declared that there existed no evidence to 
support defendant's contention that Congress had intended to  
impose "national uniformity" with respect to disclosure or ingre- 
dient reporting regulations.s2 To be compared is the decision of 
an Alabama federal trial court in Lacey v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. 
Inc.,83 in which the court held that common law claims regard- 
ing disclosure of cigarette ingredients were preempted by the 
1969 Act. 
B. Pesticide, Herbicide and Rodenticide Labeling 
In the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
("FIFRA), Congress established a comprehensive regulatory 
system for the registration and labeling of pesticides.s4 Prior to 
being placed into the market, a manufacturer must register a 
75. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 506. 
76. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1997). 
77. See id. 
78. See hlkSs. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, 8 307(B) (West 1996). 
79. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d at 58 (citing MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 94, 307(B)). 
80. Id. at 74. 
81. See id. 
82. Id. a t  85. 
83. 956 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Ala. 1997). 
84. See 7 U.S.C.A. 4s 136-136y (West 1999). See also Ruckelshaus v. Mon- 
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990-91 (1984); Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th 
Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989) (FIFRA is "an elaborate framework 
for registration of pesticide use in United States"). 
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pesticide with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").85 
As part of the registration process, the manufacturer must sub- 
mit a proposed label to the EPA for approval.a6 FIFRA requires 
that the label be "adequate to  protect health and the environ- 
ment"87 and be "likely to be read and understood."aa For pur- 
poses of this discussion, the preemption issues associated with 
FIFRA are limited to the ability of a state to permit common 
law damage actions based upon product labeling. The Supreme 
Court held in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier (Ralph)89 
that FIFRA does not preempt local governmental regulation of 
pesticide use. 
FIFRA expressly prohibits states from imposing "any re- 
quirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different 
from those required" under the Act.90 Although a state is per- 
mitted to regulate the sale or use of a registered pesticide to the 
extent that such regulation does not permit a sale or use prohib- 
ited by the Act, it is precluded from imposing labeling or pack- 
aging requirements which alter, in any way, those imposed by 
the EPA.91 
i. Decisional law prior to Cipollone v. Liggett Group 
Prior to the Court's decision in Cipollone, the lower courts 
were divided with regard to the preemptive effect of FIFRA re- 
gistration and labeling requirements upon suits brought under 
state common or statutory law for compensatory damages. In a 
pre-Cipollone decision finding no preemption, Ferebee v. Chev- 
ron Chemical Co.,g2 a trial verdict was rendered against Chev- 
ron in favor of an agricultural worker who died from pulmonary 
fibrosis allegedly contracted through long-term inhalation of 
and dermal exposure to the herbicide Paraquat. Plaintiff 
claimed that the decedent's injuries were caused by Chevron's 
- - 
85. See 7 U.S.C.A. $ 136a(a) ("Except as provided in this Subchapter, no per- 
son in any state may distribute or sell to any person any pesticide that is not regis- 
tered under this Subchapter"). 
86. See 7 U.S.C.A. $ 136a(c)(l)(C) (West 1999). 
87. 7 U.S.C.A. $5 136(q)(l)(F), 136a(d) (West 1999). 
88. 7 U.S.C.A. 3 136(q)(l)(E) (West 1999). 
89. 501 U.S. 597 (1991). 
90. 7 U.S.C.A. 9 136v(b) (West 1999). 
91. 7 U.S.C.A. $5 136v(a) and 136v(b) (West 1999). 
92. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
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failure to adequately label Paraquat to warn against the possi- 
bility that chronic inhalation and skin exposure could lead to 
lung disease and death. The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit held that in FIFRA and its accompanying reg- 
ulations (1) there was no express preemption of state common 
law actions; (2) there was no implied field preemption of such 
claims, as there was no evidence of Congressional intent to oc- 
cupy the field; and (3) there was no conflict preemption, as com- 
pliance with both federal and state law was not mutually 
exclusive. 
In holding that FIFRA $ 136v(b) did not expressly preempt 
state tort recovery, the Court of Appeals stated: 
While FIFRA does not allow states directly to impose additional 
labeling requirements, the Act clearly allows states to impose 
more stringent constraints on the use of EPA approved pesticides 
than those imposed by the EPA . . . . Given this provision, Mary- 
land might well have the power to ban Paraquat entirely . . . . [Ilf 
a state chooses to restrict pesticide use by requiring that the man- 
ufacturer compensate for all injuries or for some injuries resulting 
from the use of a pesticide, federal law stands as no barrier.93 
In concluding that there was neither field nor conflict pre- 
emption, the court interpreted FIFRA as having primarily a 
regulatory aim-to ensure that, from a cost-benefit point of 
view, Paraquat, as labeled, does not produce "unreasonable ad- 
verse effects on the environment."94 The federal appeals court 
reasoned that state tort law had both a regulatory and a 
"broader, compensatory goal, [and that] conceivably, a label 
may be inadequate under state law if that label, while sufficient 
under a cost-benefit standard, nonetheless fails to  warn against 
any significant risk."95 Although, the court continued, an award 
of damages for failure to warn imposed a dual obligation upon 
the manufacturer, Chevron could comply with both federal and 
state law by continuing to use the EPA approved label and by 
paying damages.96 The court also stated that tort recovery 
could promote legitimate regulatory aims by leading manufac- 
93. 736 F.2d at  1541. 
94. Id. at 1540; see 7 U.S.C.A. 3 136(bb) (West 1999) (defining "unreasonable 
adverse effects"). 
95. 736 F.2d at  1540. 
96. See id. 
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turers to petition EPA to allow more detailed labeling of their 
products, or by influencing the EPA to require revised labels in 
light of the new information brought to light through common 
law litigation.g7 Several courts adopted the Ferebee rationale 
and held that state common law remedies are not expressly pre- 
empted by FIFRA. For example, in Riden v. ICI Americas, 
Inc.,98 the court held that FIFRA did not expressly or impliedly 
preempt state tort claims, that state common law remedies did 
not conflict with FIFRA's purposes, and that FIFRA falls short 
of requiring uniform labeling.99 
In contrast, a Michigan federal trial court rejected the Fer- 
ebee analysis in Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,loO and held 
that the common law claims for failure to warn were pre- 
empted. The Fitzgerald court was not persuaded that a manu- 
facturer had an authentic choice with respect to altering a 
pesticide's label in response to an adverse jury award. The 
court stated that the Ferebee "choice of reaction" analysis 
"seems akin to the free choice of coming up for air after being 
underwater. Once a jury has found a label inadequate under 
state law, and the manufacturer liable for damages for negli- 
gently employing it, it is unthinkable that any manufacturer 
would not immediately take steps to minimize its exposure to 
continued liability."lOl 
In reaching its conclusion that FIFRA expressly preempted 
any state labeling or packaging requirements different from or 
additional to those mandated in FIFRA, the Fitzgerald court re- 
lied heavily on Palmer v. Liggettl02 and the Palmer court's pur- 
97. See id. a t  1541. 
98. 763 F. Supp. 1500 (W.D.Mo. 1991). 
99. See Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D.Ill. 1988) 
(adopting Ferebee rationale and concluding that legislative history indicates 
FIFRA regulations not intended to be so comprehensive as to occupy field). See also 
Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.Ind. 1990); Stew- 
art  v. Ortho Consumer Prods., 1990 WL 36129 (E.D.La. 1990); Whitener v. Reilly 
Indus., Inc., No. 87-5224, slip op. a t  4 (D.111. 1989); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 
704 F. Supp. 85,87 (E.D.Pa. 1989). 
100. 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D.Mich. 1987). 
101. Id. a t  407 (quoting Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627-28 
(1st Cir. 1987). 
102. 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987). 
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ported rejection of Ferebee.103 The Fitzgerald court held that 
whereas federal statute preempts any state regulation of labels, 
any recovery in tort is precluded. To hold otherwise "would 
have effectively authorized the state t o  do through the back 
door exactly what it cannot do through the front."l04 Several 
courts criticized the Fitzgerald court's reliance on Palmer,l05 but 
followed its conclusion and held that FIFRA preempts common 
law failure to  warn claims.lO6 
103. Although the Palmer court noted its dissatisfaction with the Ferebee 
"choice of reaction" analysis as i t  applied to the 1969 Act, i t  did not question or 
criticize its application to FIFRA. 
104. Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, 681 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1987). 
105. Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 n.13 (W.D.Mo. 
1991); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D.Mo. 1989). Palmer, 
825 F.2d at 628, distinguished the Ferebee analysis on the basis that: 
FIFRA, which applies to some 40,000 different herbicide and pesticide for- 
mulations, imposes upon an entirely different type of regulatory scheme 
from that established under the [I9691 Act. Under FIFRA, each manufac- 
turer drafts a warning label for each product for EPA approval. Thus, two 
manufacturers of the same regulated product may use different labels of 
their own choosing, provided only that they obtain prior EPA approval . . . . 
In contrast, the [I9691 Act explicitly (i) applies to cigarettes only; (ii) man- 
dates the precise language of the label; and (iii) prohibits any state from 
regulating any aspect of cigarette warnings. 
106. See Yowell v. Chevron Chemical Co., 836 S.W.2d 62 (Mo.App. 1992) 
(FIFRA preempted state wrongful death claim based upon alleged inadequacy of 
pesticide labeling); Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.Mo. 1990); 
Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D.Mo. 1989); Kennan v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799 (M.D.Fla. 1989); Little v. Dow Chem. Co., 559 
N.Y.S.2d 788 (1990). See also Jenkins v. Anchem Products Inc., 886 P.2d 869 
(Kan. 1994) (held: FIFRA preempted common law failure to warn claims as such 
claims constituted "requirement[s] for labeling or packaging [.In); Compare Hurt v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.Mo. 1990), where the court stated that 
5 136v(a) specifically allowed states to regulate the sale or use of any federally 
registered pesticide and that there was no conflict with regard to claims based 
upon the sale or application of a defective product. 
See also Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1284 (W.D.Mo. 
1989), in which the federal trial court held that  the claim that Paraquat was sold 
in an  unreasonably dangerous, defective condition when put to its reasonably an- 
ticipated use was not preempted, in that there was no Congressional intent to "oc- 
cupy the field" relating to pesticides and injuries arising from their use. Neither, 
the Fisher court held further, was plaintiffs claim that the aerial spraying of Para- 
quat was an inherently or abnormally dangerous activity. 
In Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.Pa. 1988), the court 
held that FIFRA's prohibition of state labeling and packaging requirements did 
not preempt state law tort action against an  exterminator and a manufacturer 
based on the exterminator's alleged failure to warn of dangers associated with 
termiticides used in the home. The plaintiffs injuries did not result from the de- 
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ii. Decisional law after Cipollone v. Liggett Group 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in 
Papas I and Papas 11 provide a temporal bridge between a pre- 
Cipollone FIFRA analysis and the post-Cipollone approach that 
seemingly governs today. In Papas v. Upjohn Co. (Papas I),107 
the court noted that the language in FIFRA, as well as its legis- 
lative history, could support a determination that state common 
law actions based upon inadequate labeling are expressly pre- 
empted, but declined to reach the issue.l08 Instead, the court 
found that federal preemption of common law tort claims based 
upon labeling deficiencies could be implied from FIFRA and the 
labeling regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.109 The 
court reasoned (1) that FIFRA occupied the entire field of label- 
ing regulation, leaving no room for the states to supplement fed- 
eral law, even by means of state common law tort  actions;llo (2) 
that "jury awards of damages in such tort actions would result 
in direct conflict with federal law";ll1 and (3) that "allowing 
state common law tort suits for inadequate labeling would 
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full objectives of Congress."ll2 The court stated further that 
permitting common law tort actions based on labeling claims 
"would permit state court juries to do what state legislatures 
and state administrative agencies were forbidden to  do: impose 
requirements for labeling pesticides."113 In the subsequent pro- 
ceeding before the Supreme Court, the Court vacated Papas I 
fendants' failure to comply with federal regulations, but rather from their breach 
of a duty to ensure that an appropriate warning reached not only the employees 
handling the pesticides but to the ultimate consumers of the pesticide product. 
107. 926 F.2d 1019 ( l l t h  Cir. 1991), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 505 
U.S. 1215 (19921, on remand, 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993) (held: FIFRA ex- 
pressly preempts state law claims based upon inadequate labeling or packaging). 
See also Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993)(Papas I n ,  cert. denied, 
Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 505 U.S. 1215 (1993) (state law action for damages ex- 
pressly preempted to extent dependent upon showing pesticide labeling or packag- 
ing failed to meet standards in addition to or different from those required by 
FIFRA). 
108. See Papas I ,  926 F.2d at 1023-24. 
109. See id. a t  1024. 
110. See id. at 1025. 
111. Id. 
112. 926 F.2d 1019, 1025 ( l l t h  Cir.1991). See also Lescs v. Dow Chem. Co., 
976 F. Supp. 393, 400 (W.D.Va. 1997). 
113. Id. at 1026. 
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and remanded for reconsideration in light of its recent decision 
in Cipol10ne.~~~ With the Cipollone decision now before it, the 
Eleventh Circuit entered its ruling in Papas 11, and held that 
FIFRA expressly preempted claims based upon inadequate la- 
beling or packaging.l15 A similar conclusion was reached in 
MacDonald u. Monsanto Co. ,116 in which the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals concluded that state common law judgments, includ- 
ing those predicated on a failure to warn theory, are "require- 
ments" for the purposes of preemption.l17 
In Shaw u. Dow Brands, Inc.,118 the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit compared the preemption provisions in 
both the 1969 Act and FIFRA and found them sufficiently alike 
to compel the conclusion that FIFRA expressly preempted in- 
consistent state common law demands.119 To like effect, in King 
u. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,120 a Maine federal trial court 
considered whether FIFFtA's mandate barring states from im- 
posing requirements on herbicide labels precludes state com- 
mon law tort claims. After reviewing the legislative history of 
FIFRA, the regulations promulgated to  govern the registration 
of pesticides, and guidance of Cipollone, the King court held: 
[FIFRA 5 136v(b)l says that states 'shall not impose or continue in 
effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or 
different from those required under this subchapter . . . . Since 
the 1969 Cigarette Act, which prohibits states from imposing 're- 
quirements' on cigarette advertising, was held to preempt com- 
114. 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993). 
115. Id. See also Clubine v. American Cyanamid Co., 534 N.W.2d. 385 (Iowa 
1995) (discussed and limited in Ackerman v. American Cyanamid Co., 586 N.W.2d 
208 (Iowa 1998)) (held: claims associated with label-based warranties preempted 
by FIFRA as such claims constituted additional or different requirements than 
those imposed by FIFRA). 
116. 27 F.3d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1994). 
117. Id. Accord Deshotel v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. La. 
1997) (held: label-based claims brought against pesticide manufacturer by farmer 
who experienced failure of sweet potato crop preempted). See also Ackles v. Lut- 
trell, 561 N.W.2d 573 (Neb. 1997) (held: claims based upon either failure to warn 
or fraudulent labeling claims against pesticide manufacturer preempted by 
FIFRA). 
118. 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.1993). 
119. Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992)). 
120. 806 F. Supp. 1030 (D.Me. 1992), affd, King v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 985 (1993) (FIFRA 
expressly preempts state tort law claims based upon alleged failure to provide ade- 
quate herbicide warning labels). 
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mon law damage actions with respect to inadequate warnings in 
Cipollone, we hold that the prohibition of 'requirements' under 
FIFRA preempts common law damage actions for failure to warn 
in the herbicide labeling context.121 
Other courts having the opportunity t o  consider the pre- 
emptive effect of FIFRA in light of C ip~ l lone l~~  have interpreted 
the Supreme Court's decision more restrictively. For example, 
in Burke v. Dow Chemical Co. ,123 the court undertook a detailed 
analysis of the statutory language of FIFRA to determine 
whether failure to warn claims would amount to a state im- 
posed "requirement for labeling or packaging in addition to or 
different from those required [under FIFRA] and would there- 
fore be expressly preempted."12* The court found that the pre- 
emption provision in FIFRA lies "somewhere in between the 
[I965 Act] and [I969 Act] pro~isions."~~5 The court stated that 
the prohibition upon the state imposing any "requirements" "for 
labeling or packaging" "different from" the EPA requirements, 
when viewed in conjunction with the general savings clause ex- 
plicitly authorizing each state to regulate the sale or use of pes- 
ticides, "indicate[sl a congressional design to leave the states 
with expansive powers to 'regulate' pesticides."l26 Finding the 
doctrine of express preemption to be narrow in its scope and, 
moreover, that the failure to warn claims were not implicitly 
prohibited by FIFRA,127 the court wrote: 
Applying the somewhat subtle distinctions of Cipollone, we hold 
that, if EPA-approved labels were in fact affixed to the relevant 
containers, plaintiffs may not claim that defendants' products 
were mislabeled. If, however, warnings to the trade, warnings 
apart from labels or packaging, limitation on sales to profession- 
als, or other protections falling generally within the ambit of 
warnings [which] should have been used when the content of the 
121. 806 F. Supp. a t  1036. See also Casper v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 
806 F. Supp. 903 (E.D.Wash. 1992); Brennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 613 So.2d 131 
(Fla. Ct.App. 1993). 
122. 505 U.S. a t  504. 
123. 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
124. Id. a t  1140. 
125. Id. a t  1140; see 7 U.S.C.A. 08 136v(a)-(b) (West 1999). 
126. 797 F. Supp. a t  1140. 
127. See id. at 1141. 
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label was fixed by EPA there remains a liability question for the 
trier of fact.l28 
Similarly, in Couture v. Dow ChemicalY129 the court held that 
"the narrow construction mandated by the preemption analysis 
utilized in Cipollone"l30 supported an earlier interpretation of 
FIFRA in which the court had followed Ferebee, and held that 
states are "free to regulate, through common law remedies, the 
use and sale of pesticides."l31 
It  is seen that most courts considering the matter have con- 
cluded that FIFRA expressly preempts state law claims that 
manufacturers should have used labels or warnings different 
from or in addition to those required by federal ~tatute.13~ Im- 
portantly, however, FIFRA's preemptive effects are limited to 
claims related to labeling or packaging. Other common law 
products liability or warranty claims may remain viable.133 
128. Id. a t  1140. 
129. 804 F. Supp. 1298 (D.Mont. 1992). 
130. Id. a t  1302. 
131. Id. a t  1302. See also Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks, 775 
F. Supp. 1339 (D.Mont. 1991), a f f d ,  993 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1993) (common law tort 
claims not preempted by FIFRA). 
132. See DerGazarian v. Dow Chemical Co., 836 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D.Ark. 
1993) (FIFRA preempts state common law insecticide warning or labeling claim); 
Kolich v. Sysco Corp., 825 F. Supp. 959 (D.Kan. 1993) (held: warning and labeling 
claim against manufacturer of aerosol insecticide labeled in accordance with 
FIFRA labeling requirements preempted); Levesque v. Miles, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 61 
(D.N.H. 1993) (FIFRA expressly preempts common law failure to warn claim aris- 
ing from leakage and ignition of a container of insect repellant leaked and ignited); 
June v. Carmel Chem. Corp., 602 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1993) (FIFRA preempts 
firefighter's failure to warn claim arising from pesticide exposure); Moody v. Chev- 
ron Chem. Co., 505 N.W.2d 900 (1993) (failure to warn claim preempted by 
FIFRA); Breman v. Dow Chem. Co., 613 So.2d 131 (Fla.Ct. App. 1993) (FIFRA 
preempts plaintiffs claims only to extent those claims were based upon finding 
that the product's labeling was inadequate). 
133. See DerGazarian, 836 F. Supp. at 1429 (FIFRA did not preempt common 
law action premised upon insecticide manufacturer's alleged failure to use ordi- 
nary care in formulation, inspection and testing of insecticide); Levesque v. Miles, 
Inc., 816 F. Supp. 61 (D.N.H. 1993) (FIFRA did not preempt statutory cause of 
action for breach of warranty); Bingham v. Terminix Int'l Co., 850 F. Supp. 516 
(S.D.Miss.1994) (preemptive scope of FIFRA extends only to claims relating to la- 
beling and packaging; claims involving a failure to test or inspect product, non- 
labeling claims for breach of warranty, and claims for defective design or formula- 
tion not preempted). 
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C. Motor vehicle safety 
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Company,l34 the Su- 
preme Court retreated from its Cipollone-grounded focus on ex- 
press preemption, but in so doing the Court did not necessarily 
ease the complexity of federal preemption issues as they affect 
motor vehicle safety statutes and regulations. In Geier, the 
Court was asked to analyze the effect of the express preemption 
provision in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 
("NTMVSA" or "Safety Act") on a lawsuit alleging that a 1987 
Honda was defective in design because it did not have a driver's 
side air bag. The NTMVSA, under which the Department of 
Transportation issued a federal motor vehicle safety standard 
("FMVSS") which permitted automobile manufacturers in the 
late 1980s to choose among three options for passenger safety 
restraints, does contain a preemption provision, but also has a 
savings clause, described below. 
Automobile design defect claims have been examined under 
the lens of federal law preemption for many years, and certain 
automobile design defect claims have been held preempted by 
the NTMVSA.135 The NTNIVSA delegates to the Secretary of 
Transportation the authority to establish motor vehicle safety 
standards, and the Secretary of Transportation has in turn del- 
egated the duty of standard promulgation to the National High- 
way Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA").l36 The 
NTMVSA contains a preemption clause that reads: 
(b) Preemption. 
(1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this 
chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe 
or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of 
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if 
the standard is identical to the standard prescribed in this 
chapter.13' 
While the Safety Act by its terms precludes state safety stan- 
dards with respect to "any motor vehicle or item of motor vehi- 
134. - U.S. , 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000). 
135. See 49 U.S.C. 8 30103(b)(l) (1996). The NTMVSA was previously codi- 
fied a t  15 U.S.C. 8 1381, but in 1994 was recodified. 
136. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.50 (current through September 29,2000); See 49 C.F.R. 
5 501.2 (current through September 29, 2000). 
137. 49 U.S.C. 8 30103(b)(l) (West 1996). 
Heinonline - -  21 Pace L. Rev. 129 2000-2001 
130 PACE LAW REVIEW Wol. 21:103 
cle equipment of any safety standard . . . which is not identical 
to the Federal standardYnl38 it contains a savings clause that 
reads: "(e) Common law liability.-Compliance with a motor 
vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not 
exempt a person from liability at common law."l39 
i. Decisional law preceding Geier v. American Honda 
Motor Co. 
Prior to the entry of the Supreme Court's decision in Geier, 
courts in several jurisdictions had held that compliance with 
the criteria for one of the multiple passive restraint options set 
forth in the regulations impliedly preempted a tort claim target- 
ing the manufacturer's election not to install airbags.140 For ex- 
ample, in Taylor v. General Motors, Corp.141 the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that plaintiffs state law 
claims against the manufacturer of an automobile for failure to 
install an airbag was impliedly preempted by the NTMVSA in- 
sofar as the manufacturer had sold a product equipped with one 
of the other passive restraint options available to it. Because no 
Florida appellate court had been presented with such an issue, 
the role of the Eleventh Circuit was to predict the outcome 
should the matter be heard by the State's highest court.142 The 
federal appeals court focused on Supreme Court cases involving 
federal law preempting, by implication, state law claims, in 
which the Supreme Court had ruled that "under the principles 
of implied preemption, a state cannot impose common law dam- 
ages on individuals for doing what a federal act or regulation 
'authorized them to do.'"143 Insofar as personal injury claims 
brought under state law could, hypothetically but foreseeably, 
conflict with the passive restraint system approach permitted 
138. 15 U.S.C.A. 5 1392(d) (West 1974). 
139. 49 U.S.C. 5 30103(e) (West 1996). See also 15 U.S.C. 5 1397(k) (West 
1974). 
140. 49 C.F.R. 5 571.208 SS.l(a)-(b) (current through September 29, 2000). 
141. 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1989). 
142. See id. 
143. Id. at 827 (citing Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 
450 U.S. 311, 318 (1981)). 
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by the Safety Act, to permit such claims would "take away the 
flexibility provided by a federal regulation."l44 
In Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit held that even absent ex- 
press preemption, standards published by the NHSTA pre- 
empted, by implication, a common law claim for defect in 
design. The court held that the NHSTA as amended and regu- 
lations thereunder, authorizing the manufacturer a choice of 
three different methods for occupant crash protection, one of 
which being manual seat belts, impliedly preempted a common 
law claim of design defect for the manufacturer's conscious de- 
sign choice not to equip an automobile with airbags.145 
A Wisconsin court of appeals also held that a state law 
claim for failure to install airbags in a 1980 Plymouth Horizon 
was preempted in circumstances of the defendant's compliance 
with the NTMVSA standard.146 Observing that the phrase 
144. Id. (citing Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 
U.S. 141 (1982)). See also Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 412-414 
(1st Cir. 1988); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d 1414, 1417 (10th Cir. 1996). 
145. 875 F.2d a t  822 n.13 (''me conclude that a state common law rule that 
would, in effect, remove the element of choice authorized in Safety Standard 208 
would frustrate the federal regulatory scheme."). See also Myrick v. Freuhauf 
Corp. (Myrick I), 795 F. Supp. 1139 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (held: state statutory or com- 
mon law claims would impose stricter safety standards than established by federal 
regulations and were, therefore, preempted). 
Accord Loulos v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 882 SW.2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). In 
Loulos, a motorist's claim against Ford, among others, for failure to equip a 1979 
vehicle with airbags, the court held that plaintiffs claim was preempted by the 
NTMVSA. The court noted specifically that regulations promulgated pursuant to 
the NTMVSA authorized manufacturers to adopt one of four permissible passive 
restraint system options, and that to permit a state tort law cause of action would, 
in effect, permit punishment of manufacturers for making a choice Congress spe- 
cifically countenanced. 
See also Gills v. Ford Motor Co., 829 F. Supp. 894 (W.D.Ky. 1993) (FMVSS 
208, adopted pursuant to NTMVSA, preempted common law claim seeking dam- 
ages for failure to install airbags); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116 (3d 
Cir. 1990). I n  Pokorny the Third Circuit held that state common law claims for 
failure to provide either air bags or automatic seatbelts were impliedly preempted 
by federal regulations authorizing the manufacturers their choice of safety mecha- 
nisms to be installed into the motor vehicle. However, the court held that common 
law claims for failure to install additional passive restraint systems not included 
among the options listed in Standard 208 were not preempted. See id. a t  1126. 
146. See Boyle v. Chrysler Corp., 501 N.W.2d 865 (Wis. 1993); see Panarites v. 
Williams, 629 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (state law claims arising from a 
manufacturer's election of a passive restraint system other than airbags both ex- 
pressly and impliedly preempted insofar as  judgment against manufacturer would 
impose safety requirements different from and in addition to those required by 
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"'state law'. . . include[s] common law as well as statutes and 
reg~la t ions[ . I"~~~ The state appellate court held that because 
the defendant complied with the federal act, state law claims, 
including common law claims, were preempted. To hold other- 
wise, the Wisconsin court noted, would have required judicial 
entertainment of state law claims that would have created a 
conflict with the federal standards. Lastly, the court applied a 
conservative interpretation to the Safety Act's saving clause, 
and held that "[tlhe savings clause does not operate to  preserve 
common-law liability claims that conflict with the federal safety 
standards. Rather, the savings clause preserves only those 
common-law liability claims that do not conflict with the auto- 
mobile safety equipment standards that Congress enacted."148 
A harmonious conclusion was reached in the appeal of a 
suit bringing state law claims against a manufacturer for fail- 
ure to install lap seat belts. A Minnesota state appeals court 
found the state law claims were impliedly preempted by the 
NTMVSA,149 reasoning that maintenance of potential state law 
liability, in effect, would have conflicted with the manufac- 
turer's prerogative under federal regulation to pick one from 
among a group of federally-approved passive restraint 
systems.150 
A limited preemption province was defined by the Seventh 
Circuit in Gracia v.  Volvo Europa Truck, N.V.,151 a claim 
against a truck manufacturer alleging that its windshield re- 
tention system was inadequate to prevent windshield ejection 
during collision. The federal appeals court stated the proposi- 
tion broadly that the savings provision of the Safety Act "was 
not to preserve common law claims when they conflict with 
NHTSA standards, but to prevent a manufacturer from having 
federal government); Dykema v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 525 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1994) (state law claims preempted because they would have subjected manu- 
facturers to different safety standards than established by the NTMVSA). 
147. Id.  (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. a t  521). 
148. Boyle, 501 N.W.2d a t  869; see also Gills v. Ford Motor Co, 829 F. Supp. 
894 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (FMVSS 208, adopted pursuant to NTMVSA, preempted com- 
mon law claim seeking damages for failure to install airbags); Cellucci v. General 
Motors Corp., 706 A.2d 806 (Pa. 1998). 
149. See Scholtz v. Hyuandai Motor Co., 557 N.W.2d 613 (M~M. Ct. App. 
1997). 
150. See id. 
151. 112 F.3d 291 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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a complete defense to a common law action not addressed by a 
NHTSA standard by merely stating that it is in full compliance 
with all federal safety standards."lb2 Observing that the Safety 
Act's savings provision153 should not be interpreted as 
"preserv[ing] conflicting or non-identical state common law ac- 
tions from preernption,"l54 the court held that common law 
claims were not to be preempted by the NHTSA if, and only if, 
they were identical to the federal standards.l55 
Regarding the windshield retardation standard specifically, 
the court noted that in this instance, the agency had specifically 
concluded that "given the design of forward control vehicles it 
was both technically impracticable to design windshields which 
would comply with the standards and impracticable to apply 
the standard's barrier crash tests to these vehicles."l56 Given 
the NHTSA particularized conclusion that the standard would 
not apply, the court held that "a state common law standard on 
windshield retention would, accordingly, be a standard that is 
not identical to  the federal one[,]" and was thus preempted.157 
Thus, even without backdrop of a specific standard, the 
NHTSA dormant authority to create a safety standard may pre- 
empt a personal injury claim brought under state law. Be the 
question one of passive restraint systems or another vehicle 
component within the NHTSA's NTMVSA purview, the 
agency's decision to forego application of a standard to a partic- 
ular type of product may still be given preemptive effect. For 
example, regarding the safety standard for windshield retention 
systems, and the exclusion from that standard of forward con- 
trol vehicles with a gross vehicle weight exceeding 10,000 
pounds, a t  issue in Garcia, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
explained: 
[Hlere there is a specific federal standard addressing windshield 
retention for the truck at issue, in which the NHTSA determined 
that this type of vehicle should be exempt from the affixing re- 
quirement. The Supreme Court has held that "a federal decision 
152. Id. at 298. 
153. See 49 U.S.C. 5 30102(a)(9) (West 1996). 
154. 112 F.3d at 298. 
155. See id. 
156. Id. at 297. 
157. Id.  a t  296. 
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to forego regulation in  a given area may imply an  authoritative 
federal determination that the area is best left unregulated, and in 
that event would have as much preemptive force as a decision to 
regulate."158 
In Loulos v. Dick Smith Ford, I n ~ . , l ~ ~  a motorist's claim 
against Ford, among others, for failure to equip a 1979 vehicle 
with airbags, the Missouri appellate court held that plaintiffs 
claim was not preempted, and refused to consider an implied 
preemption theory, reasoning, according to Cipollone, an ex- 
press preemption provision was "a reliable indicium of congres- 
sional intent," terminating implied preemption analysis.160 
Regarding Safety Act regulations for illumination, the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Buzzard v. RoadRun- 
ner Trucking, Inc.161 held that the plaintiffs state common law 
tort claims of inadequate lighting were not preempted. The 
court, in its decision, noted the defendant's burden to overcome 
the generally applicable rebuttable presumption against a find- 
ing of Congressional intent to preempt state law or regula- 
tion.162 Emphasizing Congress's stated goal of increasing 
transportation safety and the potential value of permitting 
states to enact more stringent regulations than are federally 
imposed to achieve that goal, the Third Circuit held that plain- 
tiffs claims were not preempted, and wrote: 
Buzzard's action could encourage increased safety by enhancing 
motorists7 ability to take in at  a glance the size, location and 
movement of tractor-trailers encountered a t  night on the public 
highways. Encouraging manufacturers to act in a way that in- 
creases safety does not frustrate the primary purpose of the 
Safety Act. Nor does it make it impossible to comply with both 
federal and state law, as it does not suggest that illumination 
equipment mandated by state common law be used instead of that 
required by federal law, but only in addition to that specified in 
Standard 
158. Id. at 296 (emphasis added by appellate court). 
159. 882 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). See also Minton v. Honda of 
America Mfg., Inc., 684 N.E.2d 648 (1997). 
160. Id. a t  152. 
161. 966 F.2d 777 (3d Cir. 1992). 
162. See id. a t  780. 
163. Id. at 785. 
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A federal trial court in Byrnes v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. , l G 4  
held that a products liability claim against the manufacturer of 
the 1990 Honda motorcycle's lighting system was not impliedly 
preempted by the NTMVSA, and explained that in the absence 
of any reference to the subject matter in the Safety Act, much 
less in its preemption provision, no further evaluation of im- 
plied preemption was necessary. Also finding no implied pre- 
emption is the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit in Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengelells~haft~l65 in 
which the plaintiffs challenged the restraint design of a Volks- 
wagen Jetta. The model a t  issue had an automatic shoulder 
belt, but no lap belt for either the driver or front seat passenger. 
Rather, the design employed knee bolsters to restrain the driver 
or passenger from sliding beneath the belt upon collision. The 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's determination that 
standards promulgated under the NTMVSA do not preempt 
common-law claims, citing the Supreme Court's decision in 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,166 which noted specifically that 
there existed no federal safety standard creating a conflict of 
compliance. 
In Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp. a suit brought 
by a motorist claiming that deployment of her vehicle's airbag 
caused her facial injuries, a federal trial court found that the 
federal standards were not design standards at all, but rather 
constituted performance standards. As such, the court 
reasoned: 
Manufacturers are apparently free to choose any air bag design, 
as long as the design meets the performance criteria[.] Thus, 
there is no conflict between the provisions of [federal law] nor its 
implementing regulations, on the one hand, and tort liability for 
defective design, on the other, because such liability "[does] not 
remove or require any particular choice, or otherwise frustrate 
'flexibility' that the federal scheme provides."168 
164. 845 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1994). 
165. 114 F.3d 1134 (11th Cir. 1997). 
166. 514 U.S. 280 (1995). 
167. 957 F. Supp. 349 (D.P.R. 1997). 
168. Id. at 354 (quoting Perry v. Mercedes Benz, 957 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th 
Cir. 1992); 49 U.S.C.A. 5 30103(e) (West 1996)). 
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ii. Geier v. American Honda Motor Company 
In the years following the Supreme Court's 1992 Cipol- 
lone169 decision, some courts and commentators have referred to 
the Court's preemption analysis as "schizophrenic"l70 or 
"shaky."l71 In Geier v. American Honda Motor Company,l72 the 
Court seemed to retreat from its Cipollone focus on express pre- 
emption, but in so doing did not necessarily simplify matters for 
litigants and trial judges seeking the proper doctrinal analysis 
by which to answer preemption questions. 
In Geier, the review of a lawsuit alleging that a 1987 Honda 
was defective in design because it did not have a driver's side 
air bag, the Court was asked to identify the specific species and 
phylum of the NTMVSA preemption provision. As noted ear- 
lier, the NTMVSA authorizes the NHTSA to promulgate and 
implement FMVS standards. The NHTSA did so, implementing 
a standard that permitted automobile manufacturers during 
the applicable time period to choose among three options for 
passenger safety restraints, while stating further that compli- 
ance with federal safety standards would not "exempt any per- 
son from any liability under common law."173 In Grier, the 
Court held that this statutory provision does not expressly pre- 
empt state common law damages actions, but, rather, that "or- 
dinary preemption principles" do.174 
The express preemption clause of the NTMVSA provides 
that states may not maintain "motor vehicle safety standardsn 
which conflict with federal performance standards on the same 
topic. In Freightliner Corp. v Myrick,l75 which involved the ef- 
fect of the absence, a t  that time, of a federal standard pertain- 
ing to anti-lock brakes, the Court, in a unanimous opinion 
written by Justice Thomas, concluded that since there was no 
federal standard in issue on the topic for eighteen-wheel trucks, 
169. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
170. Betsy J .  Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of 
State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 627 (1997). 
171. Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 96 F.3d 552, 556 (lst  Cir. 1996) 
(the Supreme Court's preemption analysis makes its application "shaky" in "a 
changing legal climate."). 
172. - U.S. , 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000). 
173. Id. a t  1915 
174. Id. a t  1913. 
175. 514 U.S. 280 (1995). 
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there was no express or implied preemption of state design de- 
fect claims based on the absence of such brakes. The Court did 
not reach the question of whether the Safety Act would preempt 
such claims if a federal standard did exist, but in the course of 
its opinion, the Court raised a question about the scope of Cipol- 
lone's express preemption analysis: 
The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a 
statute 'implies'-i.e., supports a reasonable inference-that Con- 
gress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that 
the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied 
pre-emption. . . . At best, Cipollone supports an inference that an  
express preemption clause forecloses implied preemption; it does 
not establish a rule.176 
The unanimous decision in Myrick, it is seen, foreshadowed 
a potential reinvigoration of the doctrine of implied preemption. 
Some commentators noted that the Court's preemption analysis 
after Cipollone, Myrick, and its 1996 decision in Medtronic,l77 
was less and less a true express preemption analysis and more 
and more a veiled implied preemption analysis.178 Geierl79 
proved this observation to be true. Justice Breyer, writing for 
the majority in Geier, articulated a three-part preemption anal- 
ysis: Does the express preemption provision explicitly preempt 
the lawsuit? If not, "do ordinary preemption principles none- 
theless apply?"180 If SO, does the lawsuit "actually conflict" with 
the federal statute? Of primary importance was how the Court 
answered the second question because if "ordinary," also known 
as "implied," preemption principles applied in the face of an ex- 
press provision to the contrary, then the continued influence of 
Cipollone and Medtronic beyond their precise subject matter 
precincts-tobacco labeling and medical devices respectively- 
would arguably be ripe for recalibration. 
-- 
176. Id. a t  289. 
177. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
178. See e.g. Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption That Never 
Was: Pre-emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379, 1418-1419 
(1998). 
179. - U.S. , 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000). Geier was a five to four opinion. 
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Stevens, the author of both the 
Cipollone and Medtronic plurality opinions, dissented in an opinion in which Jus- 
tices Souter, Thomas and Ginsberg joined. 
180. Id. a t  1918. 
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Neither in its analysis of the NTMVSA preemption provi- 
sion nor the Safety Act's preemption clause did the majority ex- 
pend the time necessary to provide lower courts with such 
guidance as has been characteristic of the Court's prior preemp- 
tion decisions. The Grier Court declined to focus upon the 
meaning of the language of the NTMVSA preemption provision 
to determine its scope, including, without limitations, the ques- 
tion of what is meant by "standard," as distinct from the term 
"requirement" emphasized in the Cipollone line of decisions. In- 
stead, the Court concluded, with little fanfare, that the "savings 
clause" made that exercise unnecessary, and explained its reti- 
cence to interpret the term "standard" as based upon its conclu- 
sion that it should be read to include common law damages 
actions because the savings clause assumes "that there are 
some significant number of common-law liability cases to 
save."l8l In essence, the Court found that the presence of the 
savings clause triggered a narrow reading of the express pre- 
emption provision, and that further, in order to give meaning to 
the savings clause, it operated to exclude common law damages 
actions from the preemption clause's reach.182 
D. Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics 
Manufacturers of pharmaceuticals are subject to the label- 
ing and formulation standards articulated by the Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA).ls3 Also, pharmaceutical sellers and 
manufacturers may be held strictly liable for injuries that re- 
sult from their failure to  warn of product dangers that are 
known or knowable within the scientific field.lB4 
In the realm of pharmaceuticals, the FDCA contains no lan- 
guage expressly preempting claims brought under state law.ls5 
Moreover, courts considering the issue have held generally that 
with regard to health and safety issues, the statutory language 
181. Id. 
182. See id. stating, 'We have found no convincing indication that  Congress 
wanted to preempt not only state statutes and regulations, but also common-law 
tort actions." Id. a t  1918. 
183. 21 U.S.C. 5 301-394 (1988 & Supp. I11 1991). 
184. See Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996) (citing Anderson 
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (1991)). 
185. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1299 (D. Minn 1988). 
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does not evince a congressional objective to so occupy the field of 
pharmaceutical regulation as to impliedly preempt state 
claims.186 Support for this conclusion can be found in MacDon- 
ald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,ls7 in which the court re- 
jected the manufacturer's preemption defense.lS8 The 
MacDonald court held that "[tlhe regulatory history of the FDA 
requirements belies any objective to cloak them with preemp- 
tive effect."lsg 
The Supreme Court has held that where Congress has not 
expressly preempted state tort law claims, there exists a strong 
presumption against implied preemption unless there are ex- 
ceptional circumstances involved.190 The District Court in 
Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc.lgl inferred from the absence of ex- 
press preemption that Congress, via the FDCA, had not in- 
tended to preempt state regulations imposed upon a vaccine's 
manufacture, distribution and labeling.lg2 
As stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 
Merrell Dow Phamaceuticals v. Oxendine'l93 a Bendectin suit, 
"FDA prescription drug regulations and safety determinations 
are intended to be minimum standards which 'do not conflict 
with state law which sets higher standards for due care and 
safety in the manufacture of drugs.'"lg4 One federal trial court 
described the underlying rationale for finding no necessary con- 
flict between state tort remedies and FDA regulation in terms 
of the differing objectives of regulation and actions in tort: 
[Flederal regulation serves a very different purpose than state 
tort law. Essentially, federal regulation serves a deterrent pur- 
186. See Reese v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75 
(1995), review granted, 34 Cal. App. 4th 19, 39 Cal. App. 4th 160,43 Cal. App. 4th 
1317. Special issues concerning medical devices and the statutory and regulatory 
treatment pertinent thereto are discussed in 8 III(D). See Richard C. Ausness, 
Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44 S.C.L. REV. 218-225 
(1993). 
187. 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985). 
188. See Ausness, supra note 186, a t  218-25. 
189. Id. a t  219 (quoting MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d a t  70). 
190. See Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 239, 246 (E.D. Pa. 1990) 
(citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 726 (1981)). 
191. 742 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
192. See id. at 248. 
193. 649 A.2d 825 (D.C. App. 1994). 
194. Id. a t  828 (citations omitted). 
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pose by limiting the manufacture of inherently dangerous prod- 
ucts to those applicants who meet stringent safety standards, 
while state tort law serves the equally important purpose of com- 
pensating individuals injured by those very same products. Since 
compliance with FDA regulations will not insure that a manufac- 
turer's products will not cause injury, compliance will not neces- 
sarily exempt a manufacturer from liability. When those 
products do cause injuries, the state tort system provides a means 
of compensation. State tort law is intended to supplement federal 
regulation by providing a vehicle for compensation of vaccine-re- 
lated injuries.lg5 
Many individuals have brought actions against diphtheria, 
pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) vaccine manufacturers.lg6 The ab- 
sence of an express congressional declaration as to whether fed- 
eral regulation preempts state law concerning the labeling and 
design of the DPT vaccination has led to a split in the decisional 
law.197 Many courts have held that FDA approval of the DPT 
vaccine does not preempt more stringent state standards. 
These courts reason that the product's design may not necessa- 
rily be the safest, technologically achievable design, because the 
FDA is only able to approve those designs that are submitted by 
the manufacturers. Therefore, the reasoning continues, states 
are able to impose higher standards upon these manufacturers, 
in order to  promote product and public safety.lg8 
While the FDCA contains no provision that would expressly 
preempt state food and drug requirements in general, there are 
several areas where the FDA has interposed product specific or 
195. Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 239,247 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (cita- 
tions omitted) (suit against manufacturer of measles, mumps and rubella vaccine). 
196. See Ausness, supra note 186, a t  219. 
197. Compare Wack v. Lederle Labs., 666 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (dis- 
allowing defendant's claim of implied "field" preemption based on FDA's extensive 
regulation of the subject matter); Patten v. Lederle Labs., 676 F. Supp. 233 (D. 
Utah 1987); MacGillivray v. Lederle Labs., 667 F. Supp. 743 (D.N.M. 1987) (state 
tort remedies allowed) with Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories (Hurley I), 651 F. Supp. 
993 (E.D.Tex. 1986) (DPT design actions preempted by the comprehensive nature 
of FDCA's testing requirements); Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 
(C.D. Cal. 1987). But see Hurley v. Lederle Labs. (Hurley I n ,  863 F.2d 1173 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (although plaintiff's failure to warn claims preempted by the FDCA, 
other state tort remedies permitted as Congressional intent to protect industry or 
product not sufficient to strip plaintiffs of claims against any manufacturer that 
has achieved regulatory compliance). 
198. See id. 
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subject matter specific rules which are not identical to state 
standards, or which would be vulnerable to a conflict with a 
later promulgated state standard. In some of these settings, the 
agency's regulatory initiatives have been held to impliedly pre- 
empt inconsistent state claims or regulations.199 The Supreme 
Court has explained that even conceding that most statutes and 
accompanying regulations administered by the FDA do not ex- 
pressly preempt state statutory or decisional law, such FDA 
statutes may be found to impliedly preempt state law where ap- 
plication of state law would frustrate effectuation of "the full 
purpose and objective" of the FDA's broad ranging safety-re- 
lated mandate~.~oO As is characteristic of agencies charged with 
implementing federal health and safety statutes, the FDA has 
interpreted both its governing statute and its own regulations 
as carrying a broad preemptive mantle. For example, in 1982, 
the FDA issued a Final Rule on Tamper-Resistant Packaging 
Requirements for Certain Over-the-counter Human Drug and 
Cosmetic Products201 due to a tragic incidence of product tam- 
pering of over the counter (OTC) d rug~ .~O~ According to  the final 
FDC rule, all OTC drug products that are subject to retail sale 
must be packaged in specific tamper-resistant packages 
(TRPsL203 The FDA stated that as the manufacturing and dis- 
tribution of these products is national in scope, only national 
regulations are adequate to safeguard the interest of "the entire 
p~pulation."~O~ Its rule provided further that all local or state 
199. See Geiger and Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability for Presription 
Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform 
Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 DEPAUL . REV. 395,421 (1996) ("[Sltate tort 
law should be preempted because it may well discourage the development or mar- 
keting of beneficial drugs. The possibility of deterring development is contrary to 
the FDC Act's fundamental goal of making such drugs available.") (citations 
omitted). 
200. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496. 
201. 21 C.F.R. 8 211.132 (current through September 29th, 2000)(cited in 46 
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 629, 639 (1991). 
202. See Lewis v. Beeler, 949 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1991); Elsroth v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); McNeilab, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 
645 F. Supp. 525 (N.J. 1986). 
203. See 21 C.F.R. 5 211.132(a). There were certain exceptions to this rule, 
including dermatological, dentifrice, and insulin products that did not have to be 
packaged in compliance with the ruling. See 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 629, 639. 
204. 47 Fed.Reg. 50442-01, 50448 (19821, discussed in Mark B. Gelbert, State 
Statutes Affecting the Labeling of OZC Drugs: Constitutionality Based on Com- 
Heinonline - -  21 Pace L. Rev. 141 2000-2001 
142 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:103 
packaging requirements that were not identical to the new fed- 
eral regulation were specifically preempted by the new 
regulation.205 
The FDA supplied three justifications for preemption in 
this area. First, if localities were permitted to have specific lo- 
cal requirements, the supply of specific OTC drugs might be di- 
minished if those drugs did not comply with the local packaging 
requirements. Second, the federal requirements could be essen- 
tially negated if a large state could force a drug manufacturer to 
use that state's standards throughout the country. Third, the 
product cost for each drug would substantially increase if the 
drug manufacturers were forced to adopt the different packag- 
ing requirements for different ~tates.~06 
The FDA maintains that its requirement of a pregnancy 
warning on a broad range of OTC drug products has been held 
to impliedly preempt all associated state regulati~ns.~O~ In 
1982, the FDA issued the rule that required "[alll over-the- 
counter drugs that are intended for systematic absorption, un- 
less specifically exempted" to contain the warning: "As with any 
drug, if you are pregnant or nursing a baby, seek the advice of a 
health professional before using this product."208 While some 
states, such as California, had adopted similar legislation, the 
FDA felt that "[plroliferation of such state requirements may 
weaken FDA's efforts to develop comprehensive national label- 
ing and other requirements for OTC drugs . . . ."209 If each state 
had different warnings, the FDA suggested, such state by state 
warning requirements would "prevent the full purpose and 
objectives of the agency in issuing the regulation and that 
under the doctrine of implied preemption, these State require- 
ments are preempted by the regulation as a matter of la~."~lO 
- - 
merce Clause and Federal Preemption Theories, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 629,640 
(1991). 
205. 47 Fed. Reg. at 50447. 
206. See Gelbert, supra note 204, at 640. 
207. 21 C.F.R. $0 201.63(a), (330.2) (current through September 29th, 2000), 
cited in Gelbert, supra note 204, at 640. 
208. 47 Fed.Reg. 54,750-01 (1982). 
209. 47 Fed.Reg. 39,470-01, 39471 (1982). 
210. 47 Fed.Reg. 54,750-01, 54,756 (1982). 
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In Jones v. Rath Packing C O . , ~ ~ ~  the Supreme Court held 
that inconsistent state food labeling regulations were impliedly 
preempted by the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act ("FPLA") 
and regulations thereunder. At issue in Rath Packing was a 
California statute that regulated the labeling of the net weight 
of food commodities.212 The record below was sufficient to  show 
that the average net weight for a proportion of this seller's ba- 
con and flour was less than the net weight stated on the pack- 
ages, resulting in subsequent removal of those commodities 
from the shelves insofar as they were in violation of the Califor- 
nia statute.213 The food packing company claimed that the state 
statute was preempted by federal laws which regulated labeling 
and the net weight requirements,214 drafted by Congress with 
the intent of informing consumers of accurate information 
about a package's quantity and ~ontents.~l5 The Court found 
that the FDCA did not preempt the state requirements because 
the FDCA did not "contain a preemption clause with regard to  
its food misbranding req~irements[.]"~16 The Court explained 
that the issue of express preemption arises when the "state re- 
quirements are less stringent than or require information dif- 
ferent from federal law,"217 and further found that the 
California law was not expressly preempted by any provision of 
the FPLA as the California law was more stringent than the 
federal requirements and did not require any information that 
was different from the federal law.218 Even absent express pre- 
emption, however, the Court concluded that the federal FPLA 
regimen impliedly preempted the state law inasmuch as effec- 
tuation of the state law would "prevent the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress in pass- 
ing the FPLA."219 
211. 430 U.S. 519 (19771, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977). 
212. See id. at 522. 
213. See id. 
214. See id. at 523-24. 
215. See 15 U.S.C.A. 6 1451 (West 1997). 
216. 430 U.S. at 538. 
217. Id. 
218. See id. at 540. 
219. Id. at 543. 
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E .  Medical Devices 
i. Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976 generally 
The Food and Drug Administration is empowered by the 
1976 Medical Device Amendments ("MDA)220 to the FDCA221 to 
classify and regulate medical devices. Medical devices have 
been divided into three categories: Class I devices are subject to 
"general controls" insofar as they represent only a low level of 
risk to public health and safety.222 Class I1 devices are gov- 
erned by an order of federal regulation known as "special con- 
trols,"223 a higher level of superintendence because "general 
controls by themselves are insufficient to provide reasonable as- 
surances of the safety and effectiveness of [such] devices."224 
Lastly, Class I11 devices are subject to the most rigorous MDA 
controls as they represent "a potential unreasonable risk of ill- 
ness or 
As to  devices denominated as Class 111, the MDA provides: 
"Before a new Class I11 device may be introduced to  the market, 
the manufacturer must provide the MDA with 'reasonable as- 
surance' that the device is both safe and effe~tive."~26 The pro- 
cess of providing the FDA with "reasonable assurance" is known 
as "premarket approval" or "PMA."227 The process by which a 
new class I11 device may gain premarket approval was de- 
scribed by the Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v .  Lohr228 as 
involving submission of detailed safety and efficacy information 
about the device followed by equally meticulous FDA r e v i e ~ . ~ ~ g  
Upon receipt of PMA, marketing of the device may begin. Sub- 
220. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b)-(0 (West 1999); 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1999). 
221. See 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) (West 1999). 
222. 21 U.S.C. 360c(a)(l)(A) (West 19991, discussed in Oja v. Howmedica, 
Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 786 (10th Cir. 1997). 
223. 21 U.S.C. 8 360c(a)(l)(B) (West 1999); 21 C.F.R. 860.3(~)(2) (2000). 
224. 21 U.S.C. 360c(a)(l)(B)(West 1999). See Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 
F.3d 782, 786 (10th Cir. 1997). 
225. Id. 
226. 21 U.S.C. 360e(d)(2)(West 1999). See Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 879 (Cal. Ct. App. 19971, stating, "With respect to medical devices that 
represent the highest risk to human life, the federal government imposes stan- 
dards specific to each of those devices, and Congress has declared that the federal 
standard is preemptive." Id. a t  880. 
227. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996). 
228. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
229. See id. a t  477. 
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sequent changes in the product trigger a requirement that the 
manufacturer submit a PMA supplemental application.230 
Moreover, the regulations require annual post-approval reports 
detailing changes in the device, clinical investigational results, 
or pertinent scientific literature.231 
Two exceptions exist as to the general requirement that 
Class I11 medical devices obtain premarket approval. First, the 
MDA includes a "grandfathering" provision that permits de- 
vices that were on the market prior to the 1976 passage of the 
MDA to remain on the market until the FDA undertakes and 
completes the required PMA.232 Second, as the Supreme Court 
would later summarize, and "to prevent manufacturers of 
grandfathered devices from monopolizing the market while new 
devices clear the MDA hurdle, and to  insure that improvements 
to existing devices can be rapidly introduced into the market," 
the MDA "also permits devices that are 'substantially 
equivalent' to  preexisting devices to avoid the PMA pro~ess."~33 
ii. Medical Device Act Amendments of 1976 preemption 
provision 
The MDA's preemption provision states: 
[Nlo State or political subdivision of a State may establish or con- 
tinue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use 
any requirement (1) which is different from or in addition to any 
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) 
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any 
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device 
. . . .  
234 
The FDA has interpreted this preemption provision in these 
terms: 
State or local requirements are preempted only when the [FDA] 
has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other 
specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the 
Act, thereby making any existing divergent state or local require- 
230. See 21 C.F.R. Q 814.39 (current through September 29th, 2000). 
231. See 21 C.F.R. $814.84 (current through September 29th, 2000). 
232. See 21 U.S.C. Q 360e(b)(l)(A) (West 1999); 21 C.F.R. Q 814.1 (c)(l) (cur- 
rent through September 29th, 2000). 
233. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478 (1996) (citation omitted). 
234. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (West 1999). 
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ments applicable to the device different from or in addition to, the 
specific [FDA] requirements.235 
. . . 
111. Medtronic, Inc. u. Lohr and the decisional law 
thereafter 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr236 was a products liability claim 
against the manufacturer of a failed pacemaker. On the issue of 
potential preemption, the manufacturer argued that plaintiffs 
claims were preempted by the FDA's "general 'good manufac- 
turing practices' regulations, which establish general require- 
ments for most steps in every device's manufacture, and by the 
FDA labeling regulations, which require devices to bear various 
The Court was unanimous in finding that these 
general FDA strictures did not constitute specific FDA require- 
ments applicable to a particular devi~e.~38 Rather, the court 
concluded that as to MDA 510(k) devices, state products lia- 
bility claims would not be preempted, as the 9 501(k) process 
"does not constitute FDA approval of the safety or effectiveness 
of the device, but was merely the preservation of the pre-1976 
status quo, which included potential liability under state 
law ."239 
The Medtronic Court adopted a two-pronged inquiry to de- 
termine if a state regulation was preempted by regulations or 
policies issued by the FDA. First, the federal requirement had 
to be "applicable to  the device" in question,240 i.e., the federal 
requirement would have preemptive effect only if it was "spe- 
cific" to  a "particular device."241 Second, the state requirement 
had to be "different from, or in addition to" the federal require- 
rnent,242 and thus "[sltate regulations of 'general applicability' 
235. 21 C.F.R. 5 801.l(d) (current through September 29th, 2000). 
236. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
237. Id. a t  483-84 (citations omitted). 
238. Id. a t  498-99. 
239. Martin v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 116 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir. 
1997) (interpreting Medtronic). 
240. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 472 (quoting 21 U.S.C.5 360k (West 1999)). 
241. Id. a t  472 (quoting 21 C.F.R. 5 801.l(d) (current through September 
29th, 2000)). 
242. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. 3 360k (West 1999)). 
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are not preempted except where they have 'the effect of estab- 
lishing a substantive requirement of a specific devi~e."'~~3 
Speaking finally of the relationship between the PMA pro- 
cess and the limited MDA 510(k) procedure, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
Thus, even though the FDA may well examine Q 510(k) applica- 
tions for Class I11 devices (as it examines the entire medical de- 
vice industry) with a concern for the safety and effectiveness of 
the device, . . . it did not 'require' Medtronic's pacemaker to take 
any particular form for any particular reason; the agency simply 
allowed the pacemaker, as a device substantially equivalent to 
one that existed before 1976, to be marketed without running the 
gauntlet of the PMA process. . . . There is no suggestion in either 
the statutory scheme or the legislative history that the Q 510(k) 
exemption process was intended to do anything other than main- 
tain the status quo with respect to the marketing of existing medi- 
cal devices and their substantial equivalents. That status quo 
included the possibility that the manufacturer of the device would 
have to defend itself against state-law claims of negligent 
design.244 
In Medtronic, the Court appeared to build on its analysis in 
Cipollone, focusing on express and not implied preemption anal- 
ysis. It concluded that the FDA regulations did not expressly 
preempt damages actions based on the design of the pacemaker 
in question because the language of the express preemption pro- 
vision, which preempted state "requirement[s] . . . different 
from or in addition to" any federal requirement related to safety 
or effectiveness, was not intended to include common law dam- 
ages actions based on design defects in instances where there 
was no device-specific federal requirement with which such a 
claim actually conflicted. 
Of the various Medtronic opinions, that of Justice Stevens 
garnered the plurality. Redolent of the express preemption 
analysis articulated in Cipollone, the plurality wrote: 
243. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. $808.l(d)(l) (current through September 29th, 
2000)). See also discussion in Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782,787-788 (10th 
Cir. 1997). 
244. Id. at 493. See also Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 103 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 
1997). See generally Robert J .  Katerberg, Patching the "Crazy Quilt" of Cipollone: 
A Divided Court Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, 
Znc. v. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1440 (1997). 
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[Wle have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre- 
empt state law causes of action. . . . [Wle "start with the assump- 
tion that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and man- 
ifest purpose of Congress." . . . [Wle used a "presumption against 
the preemption of state police power regulations" to support a 
narrow interpretation of such an express command in Cipollone. 
That approach is consistent with both federalism concerns and 
the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and 
safety.245 
A majority of the justices would have included common law 
damages actions within the scope of the preemption provision 
but, again, differed on whether that particular preemption pro- 
vision was to be interpreted narrowly or broadly. The plurality 
found no preemption by interpreting the scope of the statute 
and regulations narrowly, using the legislative history and the 
FDA's own interpretation as support. None of the justices ap- 
plied an implied preemption analysis.246 The concurring opin- 
ion of Justice Breyer confirmed the importance of Congressional 
intent in determining the statute's preemptive scope and com- 
plained of the "highly ambiguous" nature of the preemption pro- 
vision in issue, requiring that courts look elsewhere for help as 
to "just which federal requirements preempt just which state 
requirements, as well as just how they might do so."247 Justice 
Breyer's frustration over Congress's inability to clearly identify 
and plainly state the purpose and the scope of this and other 
preemption provisions, together with his explicit dissatisfaction 
with the task of interpreting ambiguous language, foreshad- 
owed the Court's return, in Grier v. American Honda Motor 
Company, to a focus on the implied preemption d ~ c t r i n e . ~ ~ s  
245. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citations omitted). 
246. Id. But see Justice Stevens's plurality opinion, which ended with the fol- 
lowing cryptic notation: "Until such a case [announcing a device specific require- 
ment which might require preemption] arises, we see no need to determine 
whether the statute explicitly preempts such a claim. Even then, the issue may 
not need to be resolved if the claim would also be preempted under conflict pre- 
emption analysis, see Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995)." Id. at 503 
(italics omitted). 
247. Id. a t  505. 
248. - U.S. -, 120 S. Ct. 1919, 1927 (2000). 
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In Martin v. American Medical Systems, Inc.249 the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the MDA did not pre- 
empt common law tort and implied warranty claims brought, 
under Virginia law, by a penile implant recipient alleging that 
he suffered an injurious infection due to a lack of the device's 
sterility.250 Explaining its decision, the federal appeals court 
stated: "Because the 1976 amendments so abruptly changed 
the status quo, Congress was compelled to take the existing 
market into account. Any device on the market at  the time was 
permitted to stay on the market until and unless the FDA, after 
- 
conducting a review like that for new devices, ordered other- 
wise."251 Simple identification or classification regulations have 
been held not to preempt state regulation. As such, federal reg- 
ulations do not "relate to the safety or effectiveness of the 
de~ice."~5~ 
Another departure from the PMA process is for investiga- 
tional devices. The MDA exempts investigational devices from 
the PMA process "to encourage, to the extent consistent with 
the protection of public health and safety and with ethical stan- 
249. 116 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1997). 
250. Id. a t  105. 
251. 116 F.3d at 103 (citing 21 U.S.C. fi 360e (b) (1) (A) (West 1999)); see also 
Sylvester v. Mentor Corp., 663 So.2d 176 (3d Cir. 19951, in which the state appel- 
late court followed Medtronic and held that the MDA 5 360k did not apply to those 
medical devices which had been allowed to enter the stream of commerce subjected 
to only the premarket notification process by being "substantially equivalent" to a 
product already on the market. Id. a t  178. See also Dutton v. AcroMed Corp., 691 
N.E.2d 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997), which held that devices allowed to enter the mar- 
ket via the "substantial equivalence" standard were not subject to the blanket pre- 
emption under the MDA. Id. at 740. The appellate court also held that Plaintiffs 
claim of fraudulent misrepresentation was not preempted because the MDA 
preempts claims raised as to the device's safety and effectiveness, not fraudulent 
misrepresentation. Id. at 742. But see English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477 (3d 
Cir. 19951, holding that the fact that the inflatable penile implants had been intro- 
duced to the market via the "substantial equivalence" test preempted state law 
claims against the manufacturers. Id. a t  482. The court reasoned that the MDA 
preempted the state law claims because the "substantial equivalence" test or stan- 
dard was related to the product's safety and effectiveness, barring the implementa- 
tion of state standards of the same. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and 
remanded for reconsideration in light of Medtronic. Id. at 482-83. 
252. Kealoha v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 82 F.3d 894,898-99 (9th Cir. 
1996) (action brought by recipient of temporomandibular jaw (TMJ) implants 
against supplier of raw polytetraflouroethylene (PTFE) used in the manufacture of 
the implants). Accord Anguiano v. DuPont, 44 F.3d 806, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1995); 
LaMontagne v. DuPont, 41 F.3d 846, 853 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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dards, the discovery and development of useful devices intended 
for human ~se."~53 Unlike the "substantial equivalent" 5 510(k) 
process, however, which can be completed in an average of only 
20 hours,254 investigational device status only is granted after a 
comprehensive and particularized procedure in which the appli- 
cant must set forth a report of all prior investigations, as well as 
a "description of the methods, facilities, and controls used for 
the manufacture, processing, packing storage, and, where ap- 
propriate, installation of the device, in sufficient detail so that a 
person generally familiar with good manufacturing practices 
can make a knowledgeable judgment about the quality control 
used in the manufacture of the device."255 It is in the context of 
these exacting standards and others256 that FDA approval of in- 
vestigational devices has been held to preempt state law prod- 
ucts liability claims. Thus, in Martin v. Telectronics Pacing 
Systems, Inc. ,2S7 a case involving an implantable cardioverter- 
defibrillator-demand pacemaker, one of only 50 such devices, 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "where the FDA 
has specifically approved the design of the device for investiga- 
tional purposes," to permit a state law design defect claim 
"would thwart [the federal] goals of safety and innovation[,]" 
and, accordingly, investigational device approval would be held 
to  preempt the common law ~laim.~58 
In other settings, such as claims relating to super ab- 
sorbant tampons, there have been numerous cases concerning 
tampons and toxic shock syndrome which have held that gen- 
eral FDA requirements of warning statements do, in actuality, 
constitute particularized FDA regulations that are specific to a 
particular de~ice.~59 As tampons have been classified as Class 
I11 medical devices, the FDA requires that certain information 
and warnings be affixed to the product and that the average 
253. 21 U.S.C. 5 360j(g)(l) (West 1999). 
254. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 479. 
255. 21 C.F.R. 5 812.20(b)(3) (current through September 29th, 2000). 
256. See 21 C.F.R. $812.25 (current through September 29th, 2000) (descrip- 
tions of methodology, protocols, controls, written procedures, etc.). 
257. 105 F.3d 1090 (6th Cir. 1997). 
258. Id. a t  1099. 
259. See e.g., National Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. Kimberly-Clark 
Corporation, 38 F.3d 988 (1994). 
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individual be able to understand that information.260 For exam- 
ple, the district court in Krause v. Kimberly-Clark C0rp.~61 held 
that the state law claims as to the sufficiency of warnings or 
labels were preempted, but that claims of negligence or claims 
of breach of an implied warranty were not.262 In Papike v. Tam- 
brands, Inc.263 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the 
same conclusion, holding that "[tlhe tampon labeling regulation 
is device-and disease-specific and preemption is warranted 
in this case."264 In making its decision, the court noted the 
highly individualized tampon labeling requirements set forth in 
FDA regulations.265 
Upholding the principle that FDA regulations preempt 
state regulations concerning inadequate warning claims with 
regard to tampons, there is authority to the effect that "FDA 
labeling requirements, which establish a uniform standard, 
were intended to strike a balance between product safety and 
protecting interstate commerce from the undue burdens im- 
posed by non-uniform standards."266 Because of the detailed 
warning requirements concerning toxic shock syndrome, many 
plaintiffs fight an uphill battle when litigating a negligence or 
breach of implied warranty claim. The court in Krause noted 
that the "plaintiff may have a difficult time establishing and 
proving her negligence and breach of warranty claims."267 The 
plaintiff in Haddix v. Playtex Family Products, Corp. 268 was un- 
able to  maintain her burden of proving that the tampon was 
unreasonably dangerous because of the warnings concerning 
toxic shock syndrome that were affixed to  the product's pack- 
age, as mandated by federal l a ~ . ~ 6 9  
260. See Ausness, supra note 186, at 227-28 (citing 21 CFR $ 884.5460(b)) 
(current through September 29th, 2000)). 
261. 749 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Mich. 1990). 
262. See id. a t  169. 
263. 107 F.3d 737 (gth Cir. 1997). 
264. Id. a t  742. 
265. Id. a t  739-40. 
266. Ausness, supra note 186, a t  228 (citing Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 
F. Supp. 1058, 1063 (D. Minn. 1989)). 
267. Krause, 749 F. Supp. at 169. 
268. 138 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1998). 
269. Id. a t  686. 
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F. Miscellaneous Product and Subject Classifications 
Congress has included preemption-like language in numer- 
ous statutes in addition to those highlighted in the previous sec- 
tions. Some of these legislative initiatives are fairly old, while 
others are quite modern. As has been seen, the law of federal 
preemption "to a large extent defies useful generalization[.]"270 
Rather, "[tlhe cases are very specific to the regulated subject 
[matter] ."271 
i. Federal Boat Safety Act 
The Federal Boat Safety Act ("FBSA)272 is intended to pro- 
mote boating safety through various means that include, inter 
alia, requiring manufacturers of certain boating equipment to  
comply with safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of 
Tran~por ta t ion .~~~ The Coast Guard is the federal agency to  
which this regulatory function is delegated.274 In 1988 the 
Coast Guard "directed" the National Boating Safety Advisory 
Council to evaluate whether or not the Coast Guard should pro- 
mulgate a regulatory standard requiring propeller guards. The 
Council recommended that no such regulatory action be 
taken.275 The Coast Guard adopted the Council's recomrnenda- 
270. Gurrieri v. William Zinsser & Co., 728 A.2d 832, 836 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1999) (citing WILLIAM A. DRIER ET AL., NEW JERSEY PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
& TOXIC TORTS LAW § 6.3 -.5 (1999)). 
271. Id. 
272. 46 U.S.C.A. § 4301 e t  seq (West 2000). 
273. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 4302(a)(l) (West 2000). 
274. See 46 U.S.C.A. 4 4303(a) (West 2000); see Carstensen v. Brunswick 
Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 431 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 866 (1995). 
275. See National Boating Safety Advisory Council, Report of the Propeller 
Guard Subcommittee 14 (1989), stating: 
The regulatory process is very structured and stringent regarding justifica- 
tion. Available propeller guard accident data do not support imposition of a 
regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats. Regulatory action is 
also limited by the many questions about whether a universally acceptable 
propeller guard is available or technically feasible in all modes of boat oper- 
ation. Additionally, the question of retrofitting millions of boats would cer- 
tainly be a major economic consideration. The Coast Guard will continue to 
collect and analyze data for changes and trends. . . . The Coast Guard will 
also review and retain any information made available regarding develop- 
ment and testing of new propeller guard devices or other information on the 
state of the art. 
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tion, and in official correspondence recognized and detailed its 
ongoing supervision of this subject rnatte1-.~~6 
The issue of whether the Coast Guard's decision not to im- 
plement a standard requiring propeller guards on recreational 
boats preempted state law personal injury claims arising from a 
claimed causal connection between the absence of such guards 
and injuries suffered was litigated in Ryan v. Brunswick 
Corp.277 The suit was brought by the wife of a swimmer who 
was killed following an accident in which he came into contact 
with a revolving propeller on a recreational watercraft.278 The 
FBSA preemption provision reads: 
[A] state . . . may not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law 
or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated 
equipment performance standard or imposing a requirement for 
associated equipment . . . that is not identical to a regulation pre- 
scribed under [this 
The Michigan Supreme Court, evaluating the FBSA lan- 
guage "law or regulation" with the preemptive language "re- 
quirement or prohibition" in the statute interpreted in Cipo- 
llone v. Liggett Group,280 found the difference between the two 
phrases to be "in~ignificant."~~~ Finding that the federal regula- 
tory decision that propeller guards should not be required pre- 
empted state tort law claims based upon the absence of such 
devices, the Ryan court noted that it was "join[ing] numerous 
other courts that have held that '[c]ommon law causes of action 
may constitute state regulation and [impermissibly] impose a 
requirement on manufacturers to have propeller guards 
through an award of damage~'"~82 
276. Letter from Rear Admiral Robert T. Nelson, Chief, Office of Navigation, 
Safety and Waterway Service, to A. Newel1 Garden, Chair., National Boating 
Safety Advisory Council. 
277. 557 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. 1997). 
278. See id. a t  543-44. 
279. 46 U.S.C. 4 4306. 
280. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
281. Ryan, 557 N.W.2d a t  547-48. 
282. Id. a t  548-49, (quoting Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 922 F. Supp. 613, 615 
(S.D. Ga. 1996)); see also id. a t  549, n.24 (collecting authority). 
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Reaching the opposite conclusion, the Missouri Court of Ap- 
peals in Ard v. JensenZa3 was persuaded that the FBSA savings 
clause was properly considered in pari  materia with legislative 
history indicating a legislative purpose that state statutes and 
common law continue to provide a floor for appropriate safety 
measures, or, in the court's words, "the common law [should] be 
the minimum standard to be built upon by the Secretary's regu- 
lati0ns."28~ In finding no preemption of an injured skier's suit, 
the Missouri appellate court found particularly telling the lan- 
guage of the accompanying Senate Report that "[tlhe purpose of 
the [savings clause] is to assure that  in a product liability suit 
mere compliance by a manufacturer with the minimum stan- 
dards promulgated under the Act will not be a complete defense 
to liability."285 
ii. Consumer Product Safety Act 
In Moe v. MTD Products, I n ~ . ~ 8 ~  the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit ruled that the Consumer Product Safety Act 
(CPSA)287 preempted a state common law damages ~laim.~88 
The court examined the preemptive effect of the CPSA's lawn 
mower safety standard?& which requires (1) that each power 
lawn mower have a blade control system that stops the blade 
rotation within three seconds after the operator's hands leave 
the handle; and (2) that each mower contain a label warning 
"DANGER, KEEP HANDS and FEET AWAY" and showing a 
blade cutting into the forefinger of a hand. Plaintiff injured his 
hand when reaching into his mower's side chute to remove some 
grass, and his hand came into contact with the blade, which had 
unexpectedly begun to turn. 
283. 996 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (A suit was brought against the boat 
operaor and its manufacturer when a waterskier suffered injuries when the boat 
backed over him as  he prepared to ski.). 
284. Id. a t  599. 
285. Id. a t  594 (citing S. REP. NO. 92-248 (1971), reprinted in 1971 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1352, stating "This section is a Committee Amendment and is 
intended to clarify that compliance with the Act or standards, regulations, or or- 
ders promulgated thereunder does not relieve any person from liability a t  common 
law or under State law." Id.)  
286. 73 F.3d 179 (8th Cir. 1995). 
287. See 15 U.S.C. $2051 e t  seq. (West 1997). 
288. See id. a t  181. See Moe, 73 F.3d at 181. 
289. See 16 CFR 8 1205.5(a) (current through September 29th, 2000). 
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The CPSA preemption clause provides: 
Whenever a consumer product safety standard under this chapter 
is in effect and applies to a risk of injury associated with a con- 
sumer product, no State or political subdivision of a State shall 
have any authority either to establish or to continue in effect any 
provision of a safety standard or regulation which prescribes any 
requirements as to the performance, composition, design, finish, 
construction, packaging, or labeling of such product which are de- 
signed to deal with the same risk of injury associated with such 
consumer product, unless such requirements are identical with 
the requirements of the Federal standard.290 
The Act's "savings clause7' reads: "Compliance with con- 
sumer product safety rules or other rules or orders under this 
Act shall not relieve any person from liability at common law or 
under state statutory law to any other person."291 The Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs warning 
claim was preempted, but that the design claim was 
iii. Federal Hazardous Substances Act 
The majority of courts considering the matter have con- 
cluded that compliance with Federal Hazardous Substances Act 
("FHSA)293 labeling regulations preempt state common law 
claims premised upon a party's argument that the manufac- 
turer should have provided better hazard warnings.294 The leg- 
islative history of the FHSA announced that its purpose was to 
"provide nationally uniform requirements for adequate caution- 
ary labeling on packages of hazardous substances which are 
290. 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (West 1997). 
291. 15 U.S.C. 9 2074(a) (West 1997). 
292. See Moe, 73 F.3d a t  183. 
293. See 15 U.S.C. 5 1261 et. seq (West 1997). 
294. See Salazar v. Whink Products, Co., 881 P.2d 431 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); 
see also Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 662 N.E.2d 397,407-08 (Ill. 1996) (failure to 
warn claim only available in instances of noncompliance with federal labeling re- 
quirements; to extent plaintiff urges that manufacturer should have a different 
label, claim preempted by FHSA); Kirstein v. W.M. Barr & Co., 983 F. Supp. 753, 
760-61 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (to same effect regarding warnings claim pertaining to ad- 
hesive remover); Comeaux v. National Tea Co., 81 F.3d 42 (5th Cir. 1996) (to same 
effect, lighter fluid) (authority collected a t  Gurrieri v. William Zinsser & Co., Prod. 
Liab. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 15,516 (N.J.Super.Ct. 1999) (paint primer). 
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sold in interstate commerce and are intended or suitable for 
household use."295 The Act's preemption clause reads: 
[Ilf a hazardous substance or its packaging is subject to a caution- 
ary labeling requirement . . . [under this title] designed to protect 
against a risk of illness or injury associated with the subject, no 
State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue 
in effect a cautionary labeling requirement applicable to such sub- 
stance or packaging and designed to protect against the same risk 
of illness or injury unless such cautionary labeling requirement is 
identical to the labeling requirement [imposed pursuant to this 
title] .296 
Gurrieri u. William Zinsser & C0.297 was a personal injury suit 
arising from the injurious inhalation of and contact exposure to 
a stain rem0ver.2~~ The plaintiff claimed that the label on the 
defendant's product, which contained about 2% methyl alcohol, 
should have had more vigorous language or hazard signage, 
such as a skull and crossbones, that would be mandated had the 
product contained more than 4% methyl alcoho1.299 The court 
found that the product's label complied with the warning label 
standard set pursuant to the FHSA,300 and, affirming judgment 
for the defendant, wrote: 
[Tlo the extent that the plaintiff proposes additional, different, or 
more clearly-stated warnings, [these claims are preempted by the 
FHSA].301 . . . In the present case, both [the statute and the regu- 
lations] address the labeling of hazardous or dangerous sub- 
stances. . . . A finding that specific local warnings pursuant to 
state law must apply to products containing less than 4% of 
methyl alcohol would create system of possibly fifty or more dif- 
ferent labeling requirements throughout the country, contrary to 
Congress' obvious intent in passing the FHSA to 'provide nation- 
295. H.R. REP. NO. 86-1861(1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N 2833. 
296. 15 U.S.C.A 4 1261(b)(l)(A) (West 1997). 
297. 728 A.2d 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
298. See id. a t  833. 
299. See id. a t  841. 
300. See 15 U.S.C. 4 1261(p) (West 1997); but see, 16 C.F.R. 4 1500.14(b)(4) 
(current through September 29th, 2000) (imposing different labeling requirement 
for household products containing 4% or more ethyl alcohol). 
301. Gurrieri, 728 A.2d at 841 (citing Salazar v. Whink Products Co., 881 P.2d 
431 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994)). 
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ally uniform requirements for adequate cautionary labeling.'302 
We reject this result.303 
In State ex rel. Jones Chemicals, Inc. v. Seier,304 a Missouri ap- 
peals court found similarly that the FHSA statutory language 
pertaining to product labeling preempted a plaintiffs products 
liability claim under state law and that the labeling of a 
container of muriatic (hydrochloric) acid contained inadequate 
notice of the product's risks.305 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Missouri court found that the FHSA reflected congressional in- 
tent to establish uniform nationwide standards for labeling of 
hazardous substances, and to avoid the "impracticality of hav- 
ing states produce potentially fifty different labels for a particu- 
lar hazardous substance."306 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.307 ended the long reign of 
judicial deference to state common law liability and regulatory 
obligations, and intimated that the existence of an express pre- 
emption provision might, standing alone, suffice to permit a 
finding of federal preemption. In so doing, the Court stifled the 
effect of equivalently specific savings clauses that purported to 
preserve state products liability or regulatory actions from fed- 
eral suffocation. 
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. ,308 the Court refined 
its Cipollone analysis, and in so doing gave breathing room to 
extant and future savings clauses in federal safety-related stat- 
utes. The Geier court expanded little in suggesting a means for 
lower courts to proceed with confidence in reconciling express 
preemption provisions with similarly explicit savings clauses. 
The result of the Court's recalcitrance will surely be played out 
in the decisions of lower courts which are now left to decide if 
savings and preemption clauses may be interpreted in a comple- 
302. Id. at 841 (quoting H.R.REP. NO. 86-1861 at 1 (19601, reprinted in 1960 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2833.) 
303. Id. at 841. 
304. 871 S.W.2d 611 (Mo.App. 1994). 
305. See id. at 614. 
306. Id. at 612-13, quoting Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1993). 
307. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
308. - U.S. -, 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000). 
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mentary way. The inevitable consequence of the Supreme 
Court's failure to harmonize Cipollone and Geier will be a 
bumper crop of conflicting decisions brought about by the in- 
ability of courts to determine in a consistent way whether the 
polar magnetic field of express preemption clauses, or that of 
savings clauses, is the stronger. 
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